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ALTERNATIVES TO ADMINISTRATIVE TRIAL-
TYPE HEARINGS FOR RESOLVING COMPLEX 
SCIENTIFIC, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL ISSUES 
Barry B. Boyer* 
J. INTRODUCTION 
W IT.HIN the current wave of criticism directed at the federal ad-ministrative agencies, a traditional theme of administrative 
law is frequently echoed: agencies have allowed their proceedings 
to become over-judicialized, and ought to engage in more rule-mak-
ing to avoid the slow, cumbersome, and repetitious process of case-
by-case adjudication.1 As if to confirm the urgency of these calls for 
greater use of the rule-making power, examples occasionally surface 
which suggest that trial-type proceedings may collapse under their 
• Attorney Adviser, Office of Legal Counsel, United States Department of Justice. 
A.B. 1966, Duke University; J.D. 1969, University of Michigan. Editorial Board, Vol. 67, 
Michigan I.Aw Review.-Ed. 
This Article originated as a staff report to the Chairman of the Administrative Con-
ference of the United States, and the author is indebted to the staff, members, and 
consultants of the Administrative Conference for their generous help in commenting 
on prior drafts. As usual, however, responsibility for this Article is solely the author's, 
and the views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of either the Administra-
tive Conference or the Department of Justice. 
1. See, e.g., THE PRESIDE.W's .ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, A NEW 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: Rfil>ORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES 
38-39 (1971) [hereinafter AsH COUNCIL !U:PORT]: 
The legalistic environment resulting from commission predisposition to case-by-
case analysis contributes to a passive, overly judicial approach in regulation. Fur-
ther, since the commissions are constantly absorbed with cases that are presented 
to them, they lack the time and opportunity to establish and further regulatory 
priorities .••• Agency staff has frequently become occupied with legalistic solutions 
to problems to the exclusion or deemphasis of other valuable input from econ-
omists, engineers, environmentalists, and persons trained in related disciplines. 
Equally important is the fact that the industry and the public in general are 
required to shoulder excessive costs in the search for clear expression of regulatory 
policy •••• 
Similarly, one of the "Nader Reports," R. FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE CoMMERCE 
OMISSION 11-12 (1970), charges that the ICC's reliance on trial-type proceedings "pro-
vides a legal arena for disputes among business interests • • • • Two clear examples 
indicating whom the ICC almost exclusively serves are its failure to provide for a 
consumer or public interest representative in adjudications and its inadequate use of 
the ICC rule-making function." See also Letter from Philip Elman to Sen. Edward M. 
Kennedy, in SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REsPONSES TO QUESTIONNAIRE ON CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT AND 
R.Esl'ONSIVE AGENCY DECISION-MAKING, 91st CONG., 1st SESS. 122, 166-70 (Comm. Print, 
1969). 
Each of these analyses finds somewhat different causes for the failure to use rule-
making powers. The Ash Coundl Report attributes overjudicialization to the collegial 
structure of regulatory commissions, AsH CouNCIL Rfil>ORT, supra, at 34-35, while Fell-
meth suggests that it is a result of the agency's captivity by the regulated industry, 
R. FELLMETH, supra, at 13, and Elman indicates that doctrinal misunderstandings and 
timidity on the part of the commissioners may be to blame, P. Elman, supra, at 168. 
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own weight and force some agencies to resort to rule-making if they 
are to accomplish anything at all. Thus, the Interstate Commerce 
Commission has announced that a massive rail-merger case has be-
come so unmanageable that the hearing examiner's initial decision 
must be issued in multiple volumes,2 and an experienced commen-
tator has concluded that the Atomic Energy Commission's duty to 
consider the environmental impact of nuclear reactors in trial-type 
hearings3 places AEC licensing boards "in an impossible position" 
and may well prove "undoable."4 At the same time, however, those 
who may be adversely affected by agency rule-making action often 
prefer what they conceive to be the greater procedural safeguards 
of trial-type hearings,5 and usually can find support in Congress;6 
2. Interstate Commerce Commission News Release, Sept. 1, 1971, at 1. The release 
describes the elephantine record compiled before the examiner in the following superla• 
tives: 
The [Roel< Island] case, embracing some 14 separate applications and various 
cross petitions for inclusion, is the largest and most complex unification in the 
Commission's history. The complete record consists of almost 50,000 pages of 
transcript of testimony developed at hearings held throughout the United States, 
over 1,700 exhibits aggregating about 100,000 pages including direct testimony 
submitted in the form of written, verified statements, and almost 5,500 pages 
devoted to the writing of briefs. Petitions and various pleadings too numerous to 
mention have been considered and disposed of by the Commission throughout the 
course of the proceeding. Every railroad of importance lying west of the Mississippi 
River is involved in these proceedings. _ 
3. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
4. Murphy, The National Environmental Policy Act and the Licensing Process: 
Magna Carta or Coup de Grace?, April 7, 1972, at 18, 2 (report to the Committee on 
Licenses and Authorizations, Administrative Conference of the United States [ACUS]), 
on file with the Michigan Law Review. The AEC's Director of Regulation has acl<nowl-
edged the need for more precise standards and guides. Remarks of L. Manning 
Muntzing, 2 AEC News Releases No. 47, at 15, 16 (Nov. 24, 1971). See generally Berg, 
Boyer&: Johnston, Current Problems in AEC Reactor Licensing, April 19, 1972, at 11-20 
(report to the Chairman, ACUS), on file with the Michigan Law Review. 
5. See, e.g., Hamilton, Rulemaking ow a Record by the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration, Sept. 23, 1971, (report to the Committee on Rulemaking, ACUS), on file with 
the Michigan Law Review: 
[One] justification for the evidentiary hearing [in FDA rule-making proceedings] 
has been put forth by Mr. Austern, a leading member of the FDA bar. He suggests 
that section 70l(e) [of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 
371(e) (1970)] proceeds on the theory that "he who regulates ought to appear 
publicly if there is a challenge, and put on the table, subject to cross-examination, 
the facts on which he grounds his proposal." ••• The advantage of the proceeding 
is to give the industry on whom the proposed rules are being imp~sed, an op• 
portunity, by cross-examination, to point out to the agency that the factual as-
sumptions on which the agency is proceeding are erroneous. 
Id. at 38-39, quoting Austern, Food Standards: The Balance Between Certainty and 
Innovation, 24 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 440 (1969). 
6. For example, the lad< of "procedural safeguards" such as cross-examination has 
been a recurrent theme in the recent debates over legislation designed to grant the 
Federal Trade Commission power to issue substantive trade regulation rules defining 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices. See, e.g., CoNG. R.Ec. S.17847 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 
1971) (remarks of Senator Hruska). 
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indeed, a recent study concluded that, with very few exceptions, the 
major grants of rule-making authority made by Congress within the 
past decade have contained procedural requirements that go beyond 
the notice-and-comment practice prescribed for informal rule-mak-
ing by the Administrative Procedure Act (AP A).7 Perhaps in recog-
nition of these practical pressures, some commentators have urged 
that the distinction between adjudication and rule-making can im-
pede analysis8 and that it may be useful in some areas to acknowledge 
hybrid forms of procedure incorporating various elements of both 
adjudication and rule-making, and other procedural techniques as 
well.0 Similarly, some of the current literature on environmental 
law contains references to "generic" and "ad hoc" or "particularized" 
proceedings, terms which seem designed to avoid the procedural im-
7. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237, as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 
701-06 (1970). See Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Ap-
plicability: The Need for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 
CAI.IF. L. REv. 1276, 1277 (1972). 
8. E.g., Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rule-
making and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 
485, 536 (1970): 
It is time to ask whether the approach of the Administrative Procedure Act 
classifying all administrative procedures as either adjudication or rulemaking, and 
in attempting to prescribe procedures in accordance with this classification, is not 
a hindrance to adopting administrative procedures more closely tailored to the 
needs of different agencies and distinctive agency functions. It is true, of course, 
that in setting down certain basic procedural standards for rulemaking and ad-
judication, the APA does not mandate detailed procedures. It docs ¥Ot necessarily 
preclude reasonable flexibility by an agency in adapting rulemaking or adjudicatory 
procedures to the variable needs of the agency and the interests of affected private 
parties •••• 
• • • [However,] the fact remains that the present approach of the AP A and 
the individual regulatory statutes fosters a general tendency to adopt doctrinal 
distinctions which are not conducive to a pragmatic use of either rulemaking or 
adjudicative techniques. 
Cf. City of Chicago v. FPC, 29 AD. L.2d 944, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1971): 
In many cases, it is unnecessary and even unwise to classify a given proceeding 
as either adjudicatory or rulemaking. The line between the two is frequent!}! a 
thin one and resolution of a given problem will rarely tum wholly on whether 
the proceeding is placed in one category or the other. Moreover, obsession with 
attempts to place agency action in the proper category may often obscure the 
real issue which divides the parties and requires our resolution. 
9. E.g., Murphy, supra note 4, at 42-50; Clagett, Informal Action-Adjudication 
-Rule Making: Some Recent Developments in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 
DUKE L.J. 51, 70: 
[TJhere is no statutory reason why an agency, even in a proceeding labeled "rule 
making," may not incorporate some or all of the procedures characteristic to an 
adjudication and vice versa. • • • [IJn at least a significant number of instances 
agencies should thus exercise their discretion to fashion hybrid or conglomerate 
procedural devices which would utilize those characteristics of both adjudication 
and rule making that are most appropriate in light of the circumstances and 
issues of the particular case. It is submitted, further, that, like any other exercise 
of agency discretion, an agency's decision whether to employ procedural devices 
not uniformly required by statute is subject to judicial review for abuse of dis-
cretion and should be set aside when such abuse is found. 
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plications of labeling a certain form of agency activity as either ad-
judication or rule-making.10 Since the problems and uncertainties 
surrounding the administrative uses of trial-type proceedings seem 
substantial, it may be helpful to take a fresh look at both the kinds 
of issues that seem to be causing the most difficulties in the adminis-
trative process and the attributes of the trial-type hearing in com-
parison to other forms of decision-making. 
II. ADJUDICATION AS A DECISION-MAKING TECHNIQUE 
A. Development of the Doctrines 
The propriety of a division of formal administrative proceedings 
into adjudication and rule-making was apparently not questioned at 
the time the Administrative Procedure Act was adopted,11 although 
there was some difficulty in defining the proper sphere of each type 
of proceeding.12 A major advance over the practice of classifying an 
entire proceeding as either adjudication or rule-making13 came 
through Professor Davis' development of the more functional con-
cepts of legislative and adjudicative facts. In his analysis, trial-type 
10. See, e.g., Special Committee on Electric Power and the Environment of the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Electricity and the Environment: The 
Reform of Legal Institutions VIII-24 to VIlI-25 (1972); Murphy, supra note 4, at 32-35. 
11. See, e.g., Hearings on Administrative Procedure Before the House Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1945) (testimony of Carl McFarland, Chairman of 
the ABA Committee on Administrative Law): "There are two kinds of operations 
as all studies have indicated and any practitioner knows: Number 1, the issuance of a 
general regulation, which is similar to a statute; Number 2, the matter of an adjudica-
tion, similar to the judgment of a court." 
12. The AP A defines adjudication as "agency process for the formulation of an 
order," and provides that "'order' means the whole or a part of a final disposition, 
whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a 
matter other than rule making but including licensing." 5 U.S.C. § 551 (6)·(7) (1970). 
Cf. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79th CONG., 2d SESS., ADMINISTR.ATIVE PROCEDURE Ac:r: 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 14 (1946): "'Adjudication' has not been defined generally in 
statutes, except by implication or reference to particular subjects and orders. However, 
since there are only two basic types of administrative justice-rule making and adjudica-
tion-the words 'other than rule making' serve to make the essential distinction." 
The background of these definitional sections is described in Bernstein, The NLRB's 
Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE 
L.J. 571, 615 (1970): 
The legislative history appears to demonstrate that while many changes in APA 
drafts attempted to distinguish between rule making and adjudication, Congress 
simply did not resolve the difficulties posed by the substantial area of overlap 
between the two. Agencies were expected to decide policy issues of future signif-
icance to non-parties in adjudication, but rules of general applicability and future 
effect were to be formulated in rule making (even if the parties to the proceeding 
were named and few in number). The terms used to define the two simply do not 
provide the means for distinguishing one from the other. 
13. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTR.ATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.03, at 320 (Supp. 1970) [herein-
after K. DAVIS SUPP.]: "Probably the earlier tendency of some courts to decide whether 
trial-type hearings are required by characterizing whole proceedings as either 'judicial' 
or 'nonjudicial' is declining, as it should.'' 
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proceedings are useful only for resolving questions of adjudicative 
fact "about the parties and their activities, businesses and prop-
erties," such as "who did what, where, when, how, why, with what 
motive or intent"; legislative facts, on the other hand, "do not 
usually concern the immediate parties but are general facts which 
help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and discretion" 
and therefore are best resolved on the basis of written submissions 
or oral arguments, the primary procedural techniques of rule-mak-
ing.14 
While the distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts 
has greatly improved procedural analysis, some conceptual dif-
ficulties have persisted. As in most distinctions, there is admittedly 
a "borderland" where the principle has "little or no utility."15 
Moreover, critics have contended that "[g]eneral or legislative facts 
consist of a host of particulars,"16 and consequently it may be possible 
to justify any procedural result by stating the relevant issues either 
broadly or narrowly.17 Courts applying the distinction often em-
phasize factors other than the generality or specificity of the factual 
questions, such as whether the substantive issue is "important"18 or 
technically complex,19 and whether the procedures used by the 
14. 1 K. DAVIS, An:WNISTRATIVE LAW TREAnsE § 7.02, at 413 (1958) [hereinafter K. 
DAVIS TREATISE]. See also Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 HARV. 
L. REv. 193 (1956). 
15. I K. DAVIS TREATISE, supra note 14, § 7.02, at 414. Davis provides the following 
illustration of this "borderland": 
An example of a case in which the distinction between adjudicative and legis-
lative facts is unhelpful is New York Water Service Corp. v. Water Power & Con-
trol Commission [283 N.Y. 23, 27 N.E.2d 221 (1940)]. A private water company 
applied for authorization to use certain underground water for designated pur-
poses. The Commission denied the application, relying upon a report of its execu-
tive engineer about underground water conditions in the area. The court approved 
the reliance • • • • But the court set aside the order for lack of specific findings, 
and declared that the company had not had "an adequate opportunity either 
to test by cross-examination the basis of the executive engineer's conclusions or to 
offer evidence material to those conclusions •••• " 
Id., quoting 283 N.Y. at 31, 27 N.E.2d at 224. For a further discussion of the difficulties 
of classifying borderland facts as either legislative or adjudicative in the context of 
official notice, see K. DAVIS SUPP., supra note 13, § 15.00, at 520-21 n.43, § 15.03, at 529. 
16. Fuchs, Agency Development of Policy Through Rule-Making, 59 Nw. U. L. REv. 
781, 800 (1965). 
17. See Robinson, supra note 8, at 521-22. Cf. Fuchs, supra note 16, at 801: "There 
is, in other words, an almost limitless range of possibilities about whether to cause the 
necessary determinations under a statute to be made in proceedings primarily designed 
to ascertaiq particular facts or fashioned to gather more general data." 
18. See, e.g., National Air Carrier Assn. v. CAB, 436 F.2d 185, 191-92 (D.C. Cir. 1970); 
Marine Space Enclosures, Inc. v. FMC, 420 F.2d 577, 584-86 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
19. See, e.g., National Air Carrier Assn. v. CAB, 436 F.2d 185, 191-92 (D.C. Cir. 1970); 
Marine Space Enclosures, Inc. v. FMC, 420 F.2d 577, 589 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1969); 
American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 633 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 
(1966). 
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agency comport with the court's notions of faimess.2° Conversely, the 
agency's need to expedite proceedings or other countervailing 
considerations may justify restrictions on some of the procedural 
rights which parties would otherwise enjoy in evidentiary hearings.21 
Finally, wholly apart from the question of what procedural rights 
a participant in a proceeding may claim, it has long been asserted 
that there are situations in which it would be desirable to use trial-
type procedures for resolving issues of legislative fact.22 In light of 
these seemingly substantial areas in which the proper choice of 
procedural techniques remains open to dispute, it is useful to 
compare the attributes and functions of trial-type hearings to other 
decision-making procedures available to the administrative agencies. 
B. The "Polycentric" Problem 
Before examining procedural techniques, it is necessary to 
attempt a more precise definition of the kinds of complex problems 
that are currently creating these great difficulties in administrative 
decision-making. One useful approach, developed by Lon Fuller, is 
the concept of the "polycentric" ("many-centered") problem. Al; 
20. See, e.g., Walter Holm 8: Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1971); 
American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 632 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 
(1966). See also Transcript, Seventh Plenary Session, ACUS, June 9, 1972, at 214-15 (re• 
marks of Judge Leventhal). 
21. See, e.g., National Air Carrier Assn. v. CAB, 436 F.2d 185, 192-94 (D.C. Cir. 1970); 
Pennsylvania Gas 8: Water Co. v. FPC, 427 F.2d 568, 576 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Marine Space 
Enclosures, Inc., v. FMC, 420 F.2d 577, 589-90 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 1 K. DAVIS TREATISE, 
supra note 13, §§ 7.08-.09. Cf. K. DAVIS SUPP., supra note 14, § 7.16, at 355. 
22. E.g., 1 K. DAVIS TREATISE, supra note 14, § 7.06, at 430-31: "[L]ack of legal 
requirement does not mean that the method of trial ought never to be used to resolve 
issues of legislative fact. Even when no legal right to a trial exists, a trial may still 
be appropriate. The question of whether to use the method of trial for legislative facts 
is one of convenience, not one of legal right." 
Similar thoughts were expressed in the 1941 Attorney General's Report: 
Rule-making proceedings do occur • • • in which an adversary element is 
present. It may be clear in advance which interests will benefit and which will 
suffer if proposed regulations are issued .••• The content of the regulations when 
issued may be definite and the consequences of non-compliance severe, such as 
the loss of the right to do business. Under these circumstances it may be desirable 
to let affected parties treat the rule-making proceedings as adversary, so that all 
the information, conclusions, and arguments submitted to the agency may be 
publicly disclosed to opposing interests which may answer, explain, or rebut. ••• 
The application of the procedures of a judicial trial to administrative rule-
making is limited, however, by the distinctive characteristics of rule-making 
proceedings. The issues are normally complex and numerous; the parties may be 
diverse and not aliguable into classes; the outcome will involve a judgment con-
cerning the consequences of rules to be prescribed for the future and a discretion 
in devising measures to effectuate the policies of the statute. • • • 
No general statement of the types of rule-making in which adversary hearings 
should be used seems possible. 
ATIORNEY GENERAL'S COMMllTEE ON .ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT, s. Doc. 
No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 108-10 (1941). 
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described by Fuller, the polycentric issue is characterized by a large 
number of possible results and by the fact that many interests or 
groups will be affected by any solution adopted;23 thus, each potential 
solution will have complex and unique ramifications. In graphic 
terms, the polycentric controversy can be visualized as a spider web, 
since "[a] pull on one strand will distribute tensions after a com-
plicated pattern throughout the web as a whole .... [E]ach crossing 
of strands is a distinct center for distributing tension."24 Decisions 
of this kind can be considered basically economic since they involve 
trade-offs affecting the allocation of scarce resources. Because the 
number of relevant variables is large and because this type of 
decision requires prediction or "planning,"25 the decision-making 
process should provide input from scientists in technical or be-
havioral disciplines that have developed techniques for manipulat-
ing multiple variables and predicting future occurrences or behavior. 
Perhaps the clearest example of problems that seem "poly-
centric" can be found in the field of environmental protection. 
23. Fuller, The Forms and Lim.its of Adjudication 36 (1959) (unpublished article 
prepared for the Roundtable on Jurisprudence, Association of American Law Schools), 
on file with the Michigan Law Review [hereinafter Fuller on Adjudication]: 
Suppose in a socialist regime it were decided to have all wages and prices set 
by courts which would proceed after the usual forms of adjudication •.•• [T]he 
forms of adjudication cannot encompass and take into account the complex: re• 
percussions that may result from any change in prices or wages. A rise in the 
price of aluminum may affect in varying degrees the demand for, and therefore 
the proper price of, thirty kinds of steel, twenty kinds of plastics, an infinitude of 
woods, other metals, etc. Each of these separate effects may have its own complex: 
repercussions in the economy. In such a case it is simply impossible to afford 
each affected party a meaningful participation through proofs and arguments. It 
is a matter of capital importance to note that it is not merely a question of the 
huge number of possibly affected parties, significant as that aspect ••• may be. A 
more fundamental point is that each of the various forms that an award might 
take (say a three cent increase per pound, a four cent increase, a five cent increase, 
etc.) could have a different set of repercussions and might require in each instance 
a redefinition of the "parties affected." 
24. Id. See also Jowell, The Limits of the Public Hearing as a Tool of Public 
Planning, 21 AD. L. R.Ev. 123, 147-52 (1969). 
25. In Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227, 1231-32 (1966), 
administrative control is divided into three general categories: (1) regulation, or the 
enforcement of prohibitions on specified conduct; (2) allocation, or the apportionment 
of a scarce resource such as the broadcast spectrum; and (3) planning, as in the FPC's 
responsibility to assure that hydroelectric projects are consistent with a comprehensive 
plan for the development of a river basin. Reich's thesis is that administrative legisla• 
tion is heavily weighed in favor of the regulatory approach, particularly in light of 
its reliance on adjudication as a decision-making technique, and that as a result 
planning must be performed in an ad hoc, sub rosa fashion. It should be noted, how-
ever, that agency activity which is purely regulatory in nature can have a substantial 
"planning" impact; for example, agency enforcement of low tolerances for the dis• 
charge of pollutants will cause the regulated industry to internalize certain costs, 
thereby affecting decisions on resource allocation which may have broad-ranging social 
effects. Cf. Note, The Cost-Internalization Case for Class Actions, 21 STAN. L. REv. 383 
(1969). In other words, problems consigned to regulation can be just as polycentric as 
issues which are entrusted to a planning process. 
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Thus, the question of whether water pollution in a particular stream 
should be wholly or partially abated raises a host of subsidiary 
issues affecting a variety of interests which include the profit interest 
of management and stockholders in companies doing business in 
the area; the health, employment, and taxation concerns of the 
local populace; the recreational, scenic, or ecological value of the 
watershed to the region or to the country as a whole; the probable 
impact on consumers of goods and services produced in the area; 
and the effect of pollution abatement on broad national goals such 
as increasing gross national product, fostering competition among 
companies trading in the same market, and maintaining a sound 
balance-of-payments position.26 The agencies' task of accommodating 
these myriad conflicting interests under the National Environmental 
Policy Act27 has been described by one court as a matter of deter-
mining what the "optimally beneficial action" would be in the 
particular circumstances.28 Similar considerations are inherent in 
the question of what safety features and practices should be required 
of enterprises engaged in manufacturing automobiles or designing 
nuclear reactors or operating coal mines. Regulation of price and 
entry in certain industries29 and the common requirement that 
agencies weigh the anticompetitive consequences of industry's ac-
tivity against projected benefits30 also affect wide varieties of inter-
ests, and make it necessary to choose among many possible solutions. 
At this point it might be asked whether some problems are 
inherently and irreducibly polycentric, or, on the other hand, 
whether polycentric problems are simply situations in which stan-
dards of decision have not been fully formulated. On the theoretical 
level, it seems likely that most of the problems confronting ad-
26. See Sax &: Conner, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970: A Progress 
Report, 70 MlcH. L. R.Ev. 1003 (1972). 
27. 42 u.s.c. §§ 4321-47 (1970). 
28. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 
1971). 
29. See Donahue, Book Review, 70 MICH. L. R.Ev. 195 (1971). 
30. See generally City of Statesville v. AEC, 441 F.2d 962, 986-87 (D.C. Cir. 1969) 
(Leventhal, J ., concurring). The fact that this type of decision requires an effort to 
find an "optimal trade-off" similar to many environmental matters is illustrated by 
National Air Carrier Assn. v. CAB, 442 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1971), which involved CAB 
approval of a transatlantic air fare agreement allegedly containing anticompetitive 
features: 
There is no single criterion, such as, for example, the failure to recover fully 
distributed costs, by which to measure conformity to antitrust principles. Rather, 
"the essential question, from an antitrust standpoint, is whether the existence of 
a market structure conducive to maximum feasible competition will be imperiled 
by approval of the agreement." 
442 F.2d at 864. 
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m.inistrative agencies would prove capable of solution through ap-
plication of general principles-if social-value preferences were 
sufficiently established so that the choice among conflicting policies 
applicable to a given matter were clear,31 and if the state of knowl-
edge were sufficient to provide theoretical constructs that would 
adequately account for all relevant variables.32 When these condi-
tions do not exist, however, the agency confronted with a polycentric 
problem must seek to find the optimal-or at least an acceptable-
trade-off. Frequently, this task must be performed in the context 
of an administrative adjudication; yet trial-type procedure may 
well be inherently ill-suited to the job. The Supreme Court recently 
noted that "courts are of limited utility in examining difficult 
economic problems,"33 and concluded that its antitrust rules estab-
lishing per se violations must be strictly observed: 
If a decision is to be made to sacrifice competition in one portion 
of the economy for greater competition in another portion, this ... 
is a decision which must be made by Congress and not by private 
forces or by the courts .... [C]ourts are ill-equipped and ill-situated 
for such decisionmaking. To analyze, interpret, and evaluate the 
myriad of competing interests and the endless data that would surely 
31. Cf. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through", in READINGS ON MODERN 
ORGANIZA110NS 154 (A. Etzioni ed. 1969) [hereinafter READINGS]. 
The idea that values should be clarified, and in advance of the examination of 
alternative policies, is appealing •••• The first difficulty is that on many critical 
values or objectives, citizens disagree, congressmen disagree, and public administra-
tors disagree •••• 
Administrators cannot escape these conflicts by ascertaining the majority's pref-
erence, for preferences have not been registered on most issues; indeed, there 
often are no preferences in the absence of public discussion sufficient to bring an is-
sue to the attention of the electorate. Furthermore, there is a question of whether 
intensity of feeling should be considered as well as the number of persons pre-
ferring each alternative .•.. 
Even when an administrator resolves to follow his own values as a criterion 
for decisions, he often will not know how to rank them when they conflict with 
one another, as they usually do. 
Id. at 156-57 (emphasis original). 
32. See E. MURPHY, GOVERNING NATURE 239 (1967): 
[T]he physical and biological scientists have had a dubious view of such constraints 
as [environmental] quality standards. For years they insisted that the knowledge 
to set standards simply did not exist, because to get it would require a merging of 
expertise from engineering, meteorology, geology, zoology, bacteriology, chemistry, 
soils, and a much longer list of disciplines and technologies. 
An example of an area in which the predominance of unique factors in each case 
makes the development of general standards extremely difficult is the siting of nuclear 
pawer plants. Each plant's safety and environmental impact depends upon the inter-
action of the plant's design features and the characteristics of the site; in addition, the 
complex physical reactions that could take place during various types of reactor 
accidents are the subject of scientific debate. See generally Berg, Boyer & Johnston, 
supra note 4, at ll-20. However, it still seems within the realm of theoretical possibil-
ity to produce mathematical and other models which would describe the physical pro-
cesses in sufficient detail to permit establishment of comprehensive general rules. 
33. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972). 
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be brought to bear on such decisions, and to make the delicate judg-
ment on the relative values to society of competitive areas of the 
economy, the judgment of the elected representatives of the people is 
required.34 
Are these same considerations applicable when an administrative 
agency resolves polycentric controversies using procedures modeled 
on those of a court? Before attempting an answer, it is necessary to 
examine the attributes of adjudication in detail. 
C. Adjudication and Related Procedures 
A functional approach to defining the essential elements of the 
trial-type hearing is provided in Fuller's emphasis on the processes 
of adjudication: 
[I']he distinguishing characteristic of adjudication lies in the fact 
that it confers on the affected party a peculiar form of participation 
in the decision, that of presenting proofs and reasoned arguments 
for a decision in his favor. Whatever heightens the significance of 
this participation lifts adjudication toward its optimum expression.35 
Presumably, this definition could be harmonized with Davis' ap-
proach, insofar as the "presentation of proofs"-through trial 
methods of testimony, cross-examination, and so on-was limited to 
adjudicative facts, and "reasoned argument" was confined to legis-
lative facts and matters of law, policy, and discretion. The central 
features of adjudication described by Fuller, party participation and 
reasoned decision, serve to distinguish it from two closely related 
forms of decision-making. 
The first related method may be described in terms of an 
investigatory or inquisitorial model. In one respect, this method is 
similar to adjudication; a decision is reached through a process 
of "reasoning"-that is, by applying general principles to par-
ticular facts. However, the investigatory model differs from Fuller's 
notion of pure adjudication in that the decision maker rather than 
the parties has control over whether a proceeding should be initiated, 
what issues should be decided, and what data and arguments should 
34. 405 U.S. at 611-12. The Court's analysis seems consistent with Fuller's more 
theoretical approach. It is his hypothesis that polycentric issues are particularly un-
suited for resolution through adjudicative procedures and that attempts to force 
these complex issues into the inappropriate judicial mold will result in either poor 
decisions or a compromising of the "proprieties of adjudication." He concludes that 
the adjudicator who is confronted with a polycentric problem often "'tries out' various 
solutions in post-hearing conferences, consults parties not represented at the hearings, 
guesses at facts not proved and not properly matters for anything like judicial notice." 
Fuller on Adjudication, supra note 23, at 43. 
35. Fuller on Adjudication, supra note 23, at 11. 
November 1972] Administrative Trial-Type Hearings 121 
be used in support of the decision. There are several situations in 
which the investigatory model may be preferable to party control 
of the proceedings. For example, it may be necessary to use an 
investigatory process when reliance on adversary presentation creates 
undesirable consequences for the entire group affected by the de-
cision because of the parties' inequality, or because of their dis-
interest in issues that should be important to the group; similarly, 
it may be desirable to diminish party control of the proceeding when 
"wise decision" requires special knowledge that would not be pro-
vided to the decision makers in the course of an adversary process.36 
Another third-party mechanism for resolving disputes is medi-
ation or conciliation. Here, as in adjudication, the decisional process 
is characterized by party participation; the difference lies in the 
fact that the decision is not "reasoned" or based on the application 
of principles to facts in the same way that adjudication is. In Fuller's 
words, the "morality of mediation" is geared toward finding an 
"optimum settlement, a settlement in which each party gives up 
what he values less, in return for what he values more."37 It has also 
been suggested that the emotional attitude of parties approaching 
decision is different in the two processes: "In the [mediation] con-
text, 'bargain' and the emotive connotations of that word are 
evoked; in [adjudication], 'judgment' and the emotive connotations 
of that [term] come into play."38 
!16. See Mentschikoff, Commerdal Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. R.Ev. 846, 847-48 (1961). 
A related decisional technique described by Professor Mentschikoff has been called 
"the umpire model": 
This model in which typically a single person is normally entrusted to render 
a decision without the participation of the parties but usually at the instigation 
of one or both parties, is typified by four characteristics: (I) the dispute itself 
must be of relatively small dimension ••• ; (2) the standards or norms that are 
brought to bear by the umpire in making his decision have to be articulated with 
relative clarity and have to reflect with relative accuracy the group's feelings about 
the appropriate standards; (3) a desire for speedy settlement must be present; and 
(4) the relevant facts must be capable of personal ascertainment by the umpire. 
Id. at 846. This description corresponds rather closely with some commentators' con• 
tentions that the administrative process can be made more efficient through greater 
reliance on tests, inspections, and investigations rather than trials. See, e.g., Gellhorn, 
Administrative Procedure Reform: Hardy Perennial, 48 A.B.A.J. 243 (1962). Obviously, 
these kinds of summary procedures are most useful in resolving problems of "mass 
justice," such as determining eligibility for grants or benefits, or making decisions in 
areas where scientific or technical standards are well established and thus beyond the 
scope of present concern. 
37. Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. R.Ev. 3, 23. A 
similar formulation is the statement that mediation "typically gives each party less 
than he originally desired or felt was his due." Mentschikoff, The Significance of 
Arbitration-A Preliminary Inquiry, 17 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 698 (1952). See generally 
Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. R.Ev. 305 (1971) [hereinafter 
Fuller, Mediation]. 
!18. Mentschikoff, supra note 37, at 698 n.l. 
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In using this theoretical framework, it is important to remember 
that adjudication, investigation, and mediation are not mutually 
exclusive categories. A single procedural structure may contain ele-
ments of more than one model simultaneously. Thus, the familiar 
arbitration device of allowing each party to select one arbiter and 
then requiring these two to select a third "impartial" arbiter can be 
viewed as a hybrid of adjudication and mediation because pre-
sumably, the partisan stance of the party-selected arbiters will inject 
a "bargaining" element into what is normally a "reasoning" process 
of deciding a controversy by adjudication.39 By the same token, a 
decision-making process can be designed to employ different models 
at different temporal stages of the proceeding. In the court action, 
for example, there will typically be a period of investigation, 
followed by settlement negotiations, and then by adjudication; the 
initiative at each of these stages lies with the parties in the adversary 
system, but the tribunal obviously plays some role at each stage 
through its supervision of discovery and preheating conferences. In 
the administrative process, with its greater procedural flexibility and 
the possibility of casting the agency staff into a variety of roles, the 
range of possible permutations on the theoretical models is sub-
stantial. 
Thus, it appears that administrative proceedings can diverge 
from "pure adjudication" by degrees and that analysis of agency 
decision-making processes can benefit from a more detailed focus on 
the various attributes of the adjudicatory model. In general, the 
attributes of adjudication can be subdivided for analytic purposes 
into four broad categories-the characteristics of the tribunal, rights 
of the parties to participate through procedural devices, rationality 
of the decision, and reviewability-all of which serve to add some 
content to Fuller's main criteria of party participation and reasoned 
decision. 
I. Characteristics of the Tribunal 
The primary quality of an adjudicator must be impartiality, for 
bias or prejudgment by the decision maker would seriously under-
cut, if not obliterate, both the rational and the participatory aspects 
of adjudication. The fundamental importance of this principle is 
39. When arbitration is conducted not by party-selected arbitrators but instead by 
decision makers furnished by some neutral body such as the American Arbitration 
Association, the "reasoning" element is correspondingly enhanced. Even in this situa-
tion, however, a "bargaining" element is encouraged since the arbiter can simply issue 
an award without articulating any rationale for it. Thus, arbitration countenances a 
"split-the-difference" approach, whereas the more rationalized process of court ad-
judication discourages compromise verdicts. 
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illustrated by the Supreme Court's holding that arbitrators acting 
under the United States Arbitration Act,40 like the judges of Article 
III courts, must be disqualified when they appear to have the 
slightest pecuniary interest in the outcome: "any tribunal permitted 
by law to try cases and controversies not only must be unbiased but 
also must avoid even the appearance of bias."41 Indeed, the Court 
concluded that "we should, if anything, be even more scrupulous 
to safeguard the impartiality of arbitrators than judges, since the 
former have completely free rein to decide the law as well as the 
facts and are not subject to appellate review."42 Administrative ad-
judicators also are free from some of the evidentiary and substantive 
limitations of the courts, and thus the requirement of impartiality 
should be correspondingly important in the trial-type hearing. The 
introduction of a polycentric issue exacerbates the risk of partiality 
because of the nebulous standards of decision, very limited role of 
stare decisis, and potentially large number of interests affected-
many of these possessed by nonparties who may well be tempted to 
employ extra-record influence. Safeguards for the independence of 
some regulatory agencies, prohibitions on ex parte communications 
and conflicts of interest, and the requirement of findings of fact and 
substantial evidence are all methods of bolstering administrative 
impartiality against direct attempts at improper influence. 
More subtle forms of bias can result from agency structure or 
from an agency's single-minded dedication to a narrowly defined 
"mission." For example, agencies that vote complaints may be dis-
inclined to dismiss the case on the merits;43 bodies that are essentially 
"construction agencies," such as the Army Corps of Engineers, may 
"tend to favor structural alternatives" when confronted with a 
problem;44 and technical expertise, itself a justification for agency 
40. 9 u.s.c. §§ 1-14 (1970). 
41. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968). 
42. 393 U.S. at 149. 
43. For example, the Commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission vote to 
issue a proposed complaint on the basis of whether they have "reason to believe" that 
a violation of the statutes administered by the Commission has occurred. If the matter 
is not settled by consent negotiations, it will be adjudicated by a hearing examiner, 
and either the FTC complaint counsel or the respondent can appeal to the full Com-
mission-the same Commissioners who concluded that there was sufficient ground to 
issue a complaint in the first instance. One former FTC Commissioner has argued that 
this practice creates risk that the Commissioners will have prejudged the issues when 
the case comes before them on appeal. See Elman, A Note on Administrative Ad-
judication, 74 YALE L.J. 652, 653 (1965). 
44. Fox &: Herfindahl, Efficiency in the Use of Natural Resources: Attainment of 
Efficiency in Satisfying Demands for Water Resources, 54 AM. EcoN. R.Ev. 198, 204 
(1964). For a discussion of the way in which the National Environmental Policy Act has 
served to broaden the horizons of administrators who have been devoted to the per-
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decisional power, may incline its holder toward a particular sub-
stantive result since experts often fall into conflicting schools of 
thought with mutually exclusive pet theories.45 The greater de-
cisional latitude that inheres in polycentric controversy may make 
these factors more important. The duties imposed on adjudicators 
of polycentric controversies may also create a risk of actual or ap-
parent bias in another way. Agency decision makers are frequently 
charged with the duty of balancing the immediate, highly vocal 
claims of the regulated industry against the diffuse, long-range, and 
unrepresented interests of those who may be adversely affected by a 
proposed action.46 To perform this task, the adjudicator will have 
to depart from his traditionally passive role to some degree if he 
is to take proper account of these remote interests; this may in turn 
lead to departures from the adjudicator's impartiality. 
Another important characteristic of the decision maker is his 
ability to understand and analyze the materials presented to him 
for decision. Since the task of deciding polycentric issues frequently 
requires substantial inputs from various kinds of experts, poly-
centricity may tend to escalate conflicts between "generalist" lawyers 
and specialist scientists or technicians.47 Trial-type proceedings tend 
to give the lawyers the whip hand and to place scientists in the 
decidedly secondary role of witness rather than decision maker. As 
will be seen in the following section, however, scientists have a more 
formance of a single mission, see Cramton &: Berg, On Leading a Horse to Water: 
NEPA and the Federal Bureaucracy, 71 MlcH. L. REv. - (Jan. 1973). 
45. Cf. Levy, Impartial Medical Testimony-Revisited, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 416, 421 
(1961). 
46. This problem has been explained in various ways by different commentators. 
For example, Reich, supra note 25, at 1238-39, asserts: "The effort to balance pulls 
strongly toward the status quo and against anything radical or bold"; at the same 
time, "[i]t tends to place emphasis on those interests which have a c6mmercial or 
pecuniary value as against intangible interests such as scenery or recreation." Simi-
larly, R. Nou., REFORMING REGULATION 39-42 (1971) suggests that the ability of the 
immediately affected regulated industry to bring criticism on the agency from Congress 
and the courts tends to make the agency give the industry a little more than it really 
deserves. 
On the other hand, Fuller hypothesizes that the attempt to adjudicate polycentric 
controversies under vague interest-balancing standards may lead the decision maker 
into a kind of psychological dependence on the regulated industry, caused by a 
"desire to escape the frustration of trying to act as judge in a situation affording no 
standard of decision. To escape from a moral vacuum one has to identify oneself with 
something and the most obvious object of identification lies in the regulated industry." 
Fuller on Adjudication, supra note 23, at 20. 
47. The characterization of the lawyer as a generalist probably is less true in ad-
ministrative proceedings than in most other areas of the law, since practice before-
and within-most agencies is in fact very specialized. However, some critics have con-
tended that even extensive specialization by lawyers will not be sufficient to provide 
adequate mastery of technical concepts, and that regulatory history suggests that a 
little learning is indeed a dangerous thing. See generally Donahue, supra note 29. 
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extensive decisional function in the resolution of some polycentric 
controversies; and there is considerable dispute on the question 
whether the traditional use of scientists as expert witnesses should 
be replaced by an administrative structure that gives them more 
responsibility for decision-making. 
2. Rights of Participation 
The first essential for securing meaningful participation in ad-
judications is notice of the existence and content of the proceeding. 
Polycentric issues may complicate the notice problem since the class 
of potentially affected parties frequently will be large and difficult to 
determine. Furthermore, the range of alternative results in a poly-
centric controversy is so large that even those persons who receive 
some type of notice may not fully realize how the proceeding can 
affect their interest. In this respect, it has been observed that rule-
making-type notice, which contains the proposed final product, 
better apprises potential participants of what is at stake.48 
The main difficulties center around the devices customarily used 
by counsel to present proof of facts in court trials: the right to 
present evidence, generally by testimonial methods, and the right 
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. In polycentric con-
troversies, these problems usually involve the role of experts who 
possess the ability to manipulate multiple variables, project future 
occurrences or conditions,49 or analyze physical and social processes 
beyond the normal range of human experience. 
48. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of 
Agency Policy, 78 HARV. L. R.Ev. 921, 932 (1965). Trial-type procedure is not necessarily 
inconsistent with this kind of notice; the Federal Trade Commission, for example, 
issues proposed orders with its complaints. 
49. It seems debatable whether the task of predicting future occurrences is signifi-
cantly different from the problem of determining present or past conditions. While 
Davis' distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts does not emphasize this 
point but rather focuses on whether the disputed matters are general in nature or 
particular to the parties, some judicial decisions have accorded weight to the uncer-
tainties of prediction. See, e.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 633 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 943 (1966): 
The particular point most controverted by petitioners is the effect of the CAB 
regulation on their business. The issue involves what Professor Davis calls "legisla-
tive" rather than "adjudicative" facts. It is the kind of issue involving expert 
opinions and forecasts, which cannot be decisively resolved by testimony. It is the 
kind of issue where a month of experience will be worth a year of hearings. 
Other commentators have contended that since we can never know what happened 
in the past with absolute certainty, the task of determining past events is basically the 
same as predicting future happenings. See Kaplan, Decision• Theory and the Factfind-
ing Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1071 (1968); Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision 
and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 1329, 1346 (1971); Fuchs, Fairness and 
Effectiveness in Administrative Agency Organization and Procedures, 36 IND. L.J. 1, 
44-45 (1960). However, it does seem clear that prediction involves a greater degree of 
uncertainty than determination of past events, since prediction requires the decision 
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One basic procedural issue that must be resolved is whether 
experts should be supplied by the parties or cast in some neutral 
role. In the past, there have been numerous proposals that the role 
of experts be changed in both administrative and judicial proceed-
ings. Instead of acting as a partisan witness, an expert might either 
be the sole decision maker,50 or share responsibility with legally 
trained decisional personnel,51 or become an assistant to the decision 
maker and thus assume a role similar to that performed by a special 
master or a judge's law clerk.52 Alternatively, it has been suggested 
that the expert remain a witness, but an impartial witness of the 
tribunal rather than a partisan of one party's position.58 Of similar 
effect is the common provision, found in statutes conferring rule-
making power, that requires an agency to consult an independent 
expert advisory committee, which would typically issue a report 
and recommendations that form the basis for further proceedings.54 
The relative desirability of these various approaches presumably 
would depend upon factors such as whether technical questions can 
be separated out sufficiently to minimize the possibility that value 
maker first to establish what has happened in the past, and then to derive trends or 
principles that suggest what is likely to take place later. It could be argued, in accord 
with American Airlines, that techniques evolved primarily for determining past events 
will not be useful in this effort. 
50. Several possible variations on the use of experts as decision makers are: making 
their determinations conclusive, according them prima facie effect, and impo5ing 
various burdens on those who would attack their conclusions. See generally Korn, 
Law, Fact, and Science in the Courts, 66 CoLUM. L REv. 1080, 1084 (1966). Cf. Upjohn 
Co. v. Finch, 422 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1970). 
51. This approach has been adopted in AEC reactor licensing, where Atomic 
Safety and Licensing Boards are composed of two technically qualified persons and a 
chairman skilled in the conduct of administrative proceedings. See generally Shapar, 
Impact of Science and Technology on Law, 28 FED. BAR J. 291 (1968). 
52. See, e.g., Address of Learned Hand, 3 LEcruREs ON LEGAL TOPICS 89, 103 (1926): 
[W]hen the natural laws under which things behave are outside the experience of 
the ordinary man, [the decision-makers] need help. My thesis is that help should 
come to them from an assistant who can inform them and not from one who 
inevitably or nearly, must take on the attitude of partisan, for partisan they surely 
become . . • . The parties could still call their own experts if they wished and 
have them testify. They would normally, however, argue from the standard 
sources of information upon the subject, such as books of reference, compilations, 
technical monographs, and the like. 
53. See w. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, .ADMINISI'RATIVE LAW-CASES AND CoMMENTS 769 
(5th ed. 1970): 
As is generally known, dependence upon expert witnesses who testify at the 
behest of parties has become increasingly uncongenial to courts, let alone to more 
specialized bodies. Coloring opinions to suit the needs of the party by whom a 
witness has been retained is widely suspected. In any event, quite apart from even 
the slightest shadow of intellectual dishonesty, experts are often retained because 
their known views are precisely the ones a party wishes to emphasize .... 
The upshot of the matter has been an accelerating tendency in judicial proceed• 
ings to divorce at least one expert from the parties, through an appointment by 
the trial court. 
54. See Hamilton, supra note 7, at 1316-17. 
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judgments will be made by experts under the guise of objective 
analysis;1515 whether useful information is already possessed by the 
parties or must be generated for purposes of making the particular 
decision;156 and whether cost burdens would create a risk of poor 
decision if the parties had the major responsibility for providing 
expert input.157 
If the expert is cast in a role other than decision maker, the 
question arises whether oral testimony and cross-examination are 
appropriate. Use of written direct testimony by expert witnesses is 
common in administrative proceedings and generally not contro-
55. For example, in performing its statutory mandate to evaluate the effectiveness 
of drugs presently on the market, the Food and Drug Administration procured the 
services of panels of scientists under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences 
-National Research Council, who were asked to perform tests on the various drugs 
and rank them according to various degrees of efficacy. One of the NAS-NRC panel 
chairmen who conducted the studies has criticized the program on the grounds that 
the categories and criteria used to classify drug efficacy were so vague and difficult to 
apply that panels reached inconsistent results, and that panel members did not realize 
the legal consequences of their decisions on the efficacy of particular drugs. Lasagna, 
FDA Efficacy Rule: Does It Work?, WALL ST. J., April 8, 1971, at 12, col. 4. 
56. When experts must undertake research and analysis solely for the purpose of 
the particular decision, as in many environmental matters and the FDA's drug effi-
cacy studies, supra note 55, it may be more efficient to have the experts be neutral 
rather than party-sponsored. 
Professor Davis' distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts depends in 
large measure on party control of the relevant information. Because the parties are 
likely to have better access to the adjudicative facts relating to their particular situa-
tion, they are allowed to prove these facts through trial-type procedures. The agency, 
however, is likely to be in a better position to assess general facts about the industry 
as a whole, and thus testimonial methods are inappropriate. See K. DAVIS TREATISE, 
supra note 14, § 7.02, at 413. On the other hand, it may be argued that parties with 
a substantial stake in the outcome of a decision will be more highly motivated than 
the agency to gather and analyze the relevant information. In addition, agencies with 
broad jurisdiction over numerous industries, such as the Environmental Protection 
Agency or the Federal Trade Commission, may in fact have little familiarity with 
problems and conditions in a particular industry. 
57. For example, it can be argued that proof of scientific fact through expert 
testimony in trial-type proceedings is such an immensely expensive proposition that 
the battle is usually won by the side with the greatest financial resources. Cf. Kadish, 
Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 
YALE L.J. 319, 361 (1957). The problem often arises when public-interest groups in-
tervene in agency proceedings to oppose the claims of industry groups who have a 
substantial stake in the outcome. In some of the leading cases, the courts have used 
language suggesting that a departure from the purely adversary system may be neces-
sary to redress the imbalance. Thus, in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 
F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966), the court remarked that 
the Commission's mandate to protect the public interest did "not permit it to act as 
an umpire blandly calling balls and strikes for adversaries appearing before it; the 
right of the public must receive active and affirmative protection at the hands of the 
Commission." In Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 
F.2d 543, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1969), the court expressed the same idea through a different 
metaphor, analogizing the intervenors to "a complaining witness who presents evidence 
to police or a prosecutor whose duty it is to conduct an affirmative and objective 
investigation of all the facts and to pursue his prosecutorial or regulatory function if 
there is probable cause to believe a violation has occurred." 
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versial.58 However, opinions concerning the utility of cross-exami-
nation are sharply, and often bitterly, divided.59 Critics attack the 
expense and delay of cross-examination, and express doubt that it is 
a useful means of detecting errors or weaknesses in expert testi-
mony. 60 Moreover, some experts may view cross-examination as a 
fruitless and demeaning exercise, and therefore refuse to take part 
in administrative decision-making involving public interrogation.61 
However, proponents of cross-examination are quick to reply that 
properly controlled interrogation can be an invaluable aid to under-
standing and assessing expert testimony62 and that in some cases 
"cross-examination can serve a more valuable function in testing 
forecasts and generalized conclusions underlying future policy 
planning than in making :findings concerning specific past events."68 
58. In addition to the savings of time and money that can be realized by use of 
written direct testimony, it has been argued that demeanor evidence has only marginal 
value for assessing expert testimony in administrative proceedings, and that since the 
decision maker will have at least a general familiarity with the subject-matter of the 
controversy, there is no need to have the direct evidence proceed at the "sedate pace" 
afforded by interrogation of counsel. W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, supra note 53, at 711-12. 
59. The Administrative Procedure Act merely provides that in adjudicative pro-
ceedings, "a party is entitled ••• to conduct such cross-examination as may be re-
quired for a full and true disclosure of the facts." 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1970). 
60. E.g., Hamilton, supra note 5, at 69-74; Westwood, Administrative Proceedings: 
Techniques of Presiding, 50 A.B.A.J. 659 (1964). Cf. Homburger, Functions of Orality in 
Austrian and American Civil Procedure, 20 BUFFALO L. R.Ev. 9, 36 (1970): "If cross-
examination really is the 'greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of 
truth,' one wonders why other legal systems have not imported that fabulous 'engine.'" 
61. See, e.g., The National Academy of Sciences and the Provision of Advice on 
Regulatory Matters to Federal Agencies, July 30, 1971, at 9 (unpublished memorandum 
prepared for the ACUS), on file with the Michigan Law Review: "NAS/NRC committee 
or panel members have not had to testify about the [drug efficacy] reports at administra-
tive hearings or in court. Indeed, it is likely that many of the people who presently 
work on these reports would be unwilling to do so if requirements for such testimony 
were stipulated in arrangements with the agency." Similarly, Hamilton, supra note 7, 
at 1290, notes that the FDA's use of rule-making on a record has "tended to cause 
alienation between the scientific community and FDA,'' and concludes: "In part, this 
has been the result of subjecting volunteer, expert witnesses to a grueling cross-
examination; in part, it arises from the common-sense notion that a formal eviden-
tiary hearing is not necessarily the best way to determine scientific principles.'' 
62. E.g., Zwerdling, A Plea for Clemency for Cross-Examination, 57 A.B.A.J. 45, 
46-47 (1971 ): 
Expert witnesses, like other human beings, vary in temperament, style and 
approach. Their prepared written testimony sometimes includes a great deal of 
puffing and salesmanship, and frequently cross-examination alone makes it pos-
sible to separate the puffing from the hard bedrock of firmly grounded expert 
opinion. Similarly, cross-examination alone will sometimes bring out into the open 
the qualifying "ifs" and "buts" that are inherent in the expert's opinion. 
There is also the taciturn expert witness whose prepared written testimony is 
marked by super economy •••• This testimony sometimes provides a useful road 
map, but little underlying rationale. The warm and intimate atmosphere of face-
to-face cross-examination is sometimes needed to flush out the real grounds on 
which a witness's position is based-whether those grounds be meager or solid. 
63. Robinson, supra note 8, at 522. Cf. Ross, The Big Administrative Proceeding: 
A Response to Mr. Westwood, 51 A.B.A.J. 239 (1965). 
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A similar rationale is that the prospect of cross-examination will 
have an important disciplinary effect on experts during the earlier 
stages of the decision-making process.64 
It also appears that cross-examination can be used for purposes 
beyond its traditional role of exposing witnesses' bias or error. 
Parties and intervenors may employ cross-examination as a sub-
stitute for discovery when other procedural devices do not provide 
adequate access to the reasons and information underlying the 
agency's position or another party's contentions.65 Even when suffi-
cient discovery is available, however, the cost of assembling and 
presenting an affirmative case may be prohibitive, particularly to a 
public-interest intervenor with limited resources. In this situation, 
lack of financial support for full litigation may dictate a strategy of 
exposing fallacies in another party's position through vigorous 
cross-examination. A similar problem is that in some polycentric 
issues there may be an absolute limit on needed expertise. illus-
tratively, for a particular environmental issue there may be only 
one or two government scientists who have made an on-site study 
of ecological impact, and insufficient time to conduct further studies 
in preparation for the hearing. To an opposing party in this 
situation, cross-examination may be the only possible method of 
building a record. Finally, some practitioners suggest that cross-
examination may be the only effective check on administrative 
arbitrariness. According to this theory, judicial review will not 
probe the agency's action with sufficient particularity to uncover 
errors or misconceptions; cross-examination, on the other hand, 
gives the opponent an opportunity to force the agency to justify its 
action in detail and in public.66 
In contrast to the problems discussed above, party participation 
in adjudication, through briefing and oral argument, has been much 
less controversial. This may be due to the fact that argument is a 
less substantial drain on agency resources than trial; it may also 
result from prevailing doctrines that hold that briefing and 
argument are appropriate in both adjudication and rule-mak-
ing,67 and that consequently there is-and should be-much less 
likelihood that a party's attempts to participate in this manner will 
be rebuffed. In polycentric controversies, the process of briefing and 
argument can be expected to assume greater importance than in 
64. Robinson, supra note 8, at 519-20. 
65. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 63, at 240-41. 
66. See note 5 supra. 
67. See K. DAVIS TREATISE, supra note 14, § 7.07. 
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normal litigation because the tribunal's latitude to make policy is, 
on the whole, greater than in bipolar controversies and because the 
issues in these proceedings do not become sharply drawn until 
relatively late stages of the decision-making process. 
3. Decisional Rights 
Fuller's two primary criteria of adjudication, rationality and 
party participation, dictate several features of the end-product of the 
adjudicative process-the decision. Rationality requires that the 
decision contain a logical explanation for the result reached, or that 
it at least be consistent with accepted principles, since "[a] decision 
which is the product of reasoned argument must be prepared to meet 
itself the test of reason."68 This argument may seem circular on its 
face; if so, a more detailed and satisfactory explication of the role 
that reasoned decision plays in the adjudicative process may be 
found in Hart and Sacks' description of the tribunal's duties of fact-
finding, law declaration, and law application.69 In their view, the 
law-application function grows in importance as the standard of 
decision becomes less precise: 
To the extent that the law formulated by the judge in general terms 
leaves open other questions than the identification, simply, of what 
happened in the particular situation presented, the application of 
law will necessarily involve judgment. Obviously, the more impre-
cise the general formulation, the more uncontrolled the judgment 
will be.70 
Since polycentric issues arise under broad "public interest" stan-
dards and are resolved by a process of balancing conflicting and 
68. Fuller on Adjudication, supra note 23, at 13. 
69. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND 
APPLICATION OF LAw 374-75, 379 (tentative ed. 1958) (emphasis original): 
First, but not necessarily first in order of time, the judge must make a formula-
tion in general terms of the relevant law to be applied. This may conveniently be 
called the function of law declaration. 
A second function may be called the function of fact identification-that is, 
the determination and statement of the relevant characteristics of the particular 
matter before the judge. • • • 
In applying a standard, a careful law-applier decides first of all what happened 
in the particular case, without yet trying to characterize the happenings in the 
way the standard calls for •... He next makes a generalized judgment, analytically 
a judgment on a matter of law, about the kind and quality of conduct which 
ought generally to be observed in like situations .•.. With this measure in Inind 
he looks again at the conduct in the particular case to characterize it and see if, 
so characterized, it meets the general standard. 
See also Weiner, The Civil Nonjury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 55 CALIF. L. 
R.Ev. 1020 (1967). 
70. H. HART 8: A. SACKS, supra I,lOte 69, at 375. 
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interrelating interests, the agency's judgment will be largely "un-
controlled"; in addition, stare decisis, which has a limited role in 
administrative proceedings in any event, will have an almost negli-
gible impact in polycentric controversies since the overall balance 
of factors will tend to be unique to the particular case.71 Conse-
quently, the adjudicator will be relatively free of "the discipline 
and restraint of an obligation to build upon the prior law in a 
fashion which can withstand the test of professional criticism,"72 
and the value of precedent in providing a guide to the structuring 
of private activity will be diminished. 
There is some corroboration for these theories in the com-
mentaries on administrative adjudication. For example, in the 
typical polycentric interest-balancing adjudication, 
the evidence adduced in hearings for purposes of proof cannot fully 
cover the discretionary issues to be determined; the agency must add 
something more in the end. ... Expert or opinion testimony may be 
introduced at the hearing with relation to the discretionary issues, 
but be later rejected by reason of agency views, even when there is 
no conflict in the testimony. The question then arises whether the 
decision really results from the hearing; and the affected private in-
terests may be disquieted by the belief that it does not.73 
Attorneys practicing before the agencies have also reported difficulties 
in preparing for a case involving polycentric issues because of the 
realization that the matter "is not susceptible to judge-like decision"; 
the result of this perception is a temptation either to inflate the 
record with proof on every factor that might possibly be relevant 
to the decision, or to resort to improper ex parte attempts to in-
fluence the decision maker.74 Similarly, Louis Hector has argued, 
from the perspective of an agency adjudicator, that the common 
practice of deciding on an outcome and then assigning the matter to 
a professional opinion writer to supply justifications "merely serves 
71. However, official notice could still be used in some situations to assure the 
consistency, rationality, and economy of decision. See Berg, Boyer &: Johnston, supra 
note 4, at 19-20. 
72. H. HART &: A. SACKS, supra note 69, at 588. 
73. Fuchs, supra note 49, at 8-9. 
74. Westwood, The Influence of Washington Lawyering, 38 GEO. WAsH. L. R.Ev. 607 
(1970). See Ross, supra note 63, at 240; Reich, supra note 25, at 1241: 
Naturally, almost anything is or may be relevant when the subject is planning. In 
an FCC, CAB, or FPC case, many different criteria are utilized by the agency in 
reaching a decision. The parties have no way of knowing in advance which criteria 
will be stressed in a given case and for all that the parties know, new criteria may 
be introduced. Accordingly, the prudent lawyer must seek to introduce evidence 
bearing on every imaginable issue that the agency might consider .••• It is the 
limitless and unfenced range of the agency's probable basis of decision that lies at 
the root of the procedure problem. 
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to confirm the nonjudicial nature of the so-called 'adjudicatory' 
processes of the regulatory agencies as they are conducted today."75 
4. Judicial Review 
The provision of judicial review for administrative action can 
be considered the final assurance that adjudicatory decisions will be 
rational and based upon party participation. Broadly speaking, 
review of questions of law implements the former criterion, while 
review of agency procedure goes to the latter point, and the sub-
stantial-evidence test affects both criteria. Since resolution of poly-
centric controversies involves interest-balancing that is heavily pre-
dominated by unique factual elements, the result may be a lessening 
in the effectiveness of judicial review.76 Courts can respond to this 
situation and try to restrict administrative divergences from the 
adjudicative model by viewing agency procedures with increased 
skepticism when the merits of the decision seem suspect.77 Oc-
casionally, the courts will confront the problems more directly by 
conducting a detailed inquiry to discover whether an agency has 
adequately considered all factors properly bearing on its decision 
and has adequately stated its rationale.78 From this approach, it is 
75. Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 
69 YALE L.J. 931, 948 (1960). It might be thought that the professional opinion writers 
described by Hector are not different in principle from a judge's law clerk. However, 
the law clerk has a more personal relationship with the judge and therefore will be 
more careful to reflect the judge's views. Moreover, it is clear from Hector's descrip• 
tion that the agency opinion writer operates under much less direction and supervision 
than the typical law clerk. 
76. See note 5 supra. 
77. Cf. Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Ar• 
bitrators, 81 HAR.v. L. REv. 721, 722-23 (1968): 
[A]t times one is convinced that, whatever the articulated reason, there lies at the 
heart of the [reviewing court's) decision a dissatisfaction with the agency's judg-
ment on the merits, a sense of frustration at being unable to reverse that judgment 
directly, and a resulting desire to compel the agency to observe the highest stan-
dards of fair procedure-including for all interested persons a full chance to be 
heard. 
78. E.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruck.elshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597-98 
(D.C. Cir. 1971): 
For many years, courts have treated administrative policy decisions with great 
deference, confining judicial attention primarily to matters of procedure. On 
matters of substance, the courts regularly upheld agency action, with a nod in the 
direction of the "substantial evidence" test, and bow to the mysteries of adminis-
trative expertise. Courts occasionally asserted, but less often exercised, the power 
to set aside agency action on the ground that an impermissible factor had entered 
into the decision, or a crucial factor had not been considered. Gradually, however, 
that power has come into more frequent use, and with it, the requirement that 
administrators articulate the factors on which they base their decisions. 
. • • Judicial review must operate to ensure that the administrative process 
itself will confine and control the exercise of discretion. Courts should require 
administrative officers to articulate the standards and principles that govern their 
discretionary decisions in as much detail as possible • • • • Discretionary decisions 
should more often be supported with findings of fact and reasoned opinions. 
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only a short step to asserting that the courts should be empowered 
to re-examine the agencies' interest-balancing de novo, unrestricted 
by deference to agency expertise or discretion; it is this position 
which some environmental groups are presently advancing in state 
legislatures and the Congress. 79 
Thus, at the same time that traditional adjudicatory proceedings 
are being severely criticized as outmoded and inefficient means of 
deciding polycentric controversies, there appears to be an equally 
strong impetus toward greater use of adjudicative techniques, even 
to the point of moving the primary decision-making responsibility 
from the agencies back into the courts. In light of this observation, 
it may be useful to examine the forces that first led the agencies to 
judicialize their proceedings. 
D. Historical Aspects of Administrative Adjudications 
A brief look at the historical development of administrative 
procedure in this country could easily lead to the conclusion that 
the adoption of trial techniques in agency proceedings was more a 
matter of historical accident than of rational choice.80 When ad-
ministrative regulation came of age in this country at the end of the 
nineteenth century, the government had witnessed a shift in the 
locus of power to control economic development from the legis-
latures to the courts;81 when this power began to move into newly 
created bodies which lacked the strong traditions of the courts,82 
See also District of Columbia Fedn. of Civic Assns. v. Volpe, 29 AD. L.2d 473 (D.C. 
Cir. 1971); Murphy, supra note 4, at 20-23. 
79. See generally Sax 8: Conner, supra note 26. 
80. E.g., Donahue, supra note 29, at 216: "Legal dominance of the regulated in-
dustries field is largely the product of historical accident." 
81. See M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 26 (1955): 
During the nineteenth century the character of economic regulation shifted 
gradually. At first it was essentially legislative •••• [Later on, however,] for the 
enforcement of railroad laws, individuals and the government relied upon the 
judicial process. As the courts proved their inability to deal with complex economic 
relationships in railroad management, attention was centered on the possibility of 
devising an administrative mechanism which would be more flexible than the 
legislature and more competent than the judiciary in dealing with complicated 
economic matters. 
Of course, these developments did not occur in the clearcut linear fashion that this 
passage might suggest; the distribution of regulatory power over the railroads was 
complex and rapidly changing throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
For a more detailed history of regulation during this period, see R. CUSHMAN, THE 
INDEPENDENT REGULATORY CoMMISSIONS 19-50 (1941). 
82. Cushman reports that temporary state commissions responsible primarily for 
reporting to the legislatures on specific problems were often created during the 1850's 
and 1860's. These bodies performed a variety of other duties, including supervision of 
charter provisions, safety inspections, arbitration of disputes involving railroads, and 
prevention of discrimination in rates and services. Between 1869 and 1887, permanent 
state railroad commissions began to emerge. In effectiveness, they ranged from the 
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it was natural for the newcomers to adopt the handy model of 
judicial procedures in doing their work. Undoubtedly, too, the fact 
that the first chairman of the grandfather of federal agencies, the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, was an eminent judge helped to 
facilitate the wholesale adoption of judicial techniques in the ad-
ministrative context.83 Perhaps the most important factor in the 
judicialization of agency procedure, however, was the prevailing 
judicial hostility to early regulatory commissions, which was mani-
fested in holdings that rate-making was "eminently a question for 
judicial investigation, requiring due process of law for its determi-
nation,"84 as well as in the courts' "steady and increasing disposition 
to do over again the [ICC's] job of finding facts, thereby under-
mining the prestige of the commission and the effectiveness of its 
orders."85 To the extent that the Commission could make its practices 
conform to those of the judiciary, it would gain some security against 
reversal on review.86 In time, the judicial model became entrenched 
in the lore of administrative law so that, as Congress reacted in an 
ad hoc fashion to subsequent demands for federal regulation, the 
trial-type hearing was incorporated almost as a matter of course.87 
By the time that the Administrative Procedure Act imposed uniform 
procedures on administrative functions for which a trial was re-
quired by law, it was assumed without question that formal agency 
action would inherently be cast in the form of either adjudication or 
quasi-legislative rule-making. 88 
This historical characterization may contain a fair amount of 
truth, but clearly there were more substantial interests behind the 
movement to impose trial-type procedures on the administrative 
agencies. Among the business community, there must have been 
many who shared the sentiments expressed in Richard Olney's 
often-quoted dismissal of the Interstate Commerce Commission: 
The Commission, as its functions have now been limited by the 
courts, is, or can be made of great use to the railroads. It satisfies 
the popular clamor for a government supervision of railroads, at 
"strong" commissions, which had the power to set judicially enforceable rates, to the 
"weak" commissions, which had only investigatory duties. R. CUSHMAN, supra note 81, 
at 21-27. Thus, it seems fair to infer that the concept of the regulatory commission 
was a rather amorphous one at the time that the federal government entered the 
field of administrative regulation. 
83. Id. at 65; M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 81, at 29. 
84. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 458 (1890). 
85. R. CUSHMAN, supra note 81, at 66. 
86. Cf. M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 81, at 29. 
87. See Reich, supra note 25, at 1231-33. 
88. See note 11 supra and accompanying text. 
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the same time that the supervision is almost entirely nominal. . • . 
It thus becomes a sort of barrier between the railroad corporations 
and the people .... so 
Business had used the courts successfully to forestall effective eco-
nomic regulation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
and so it might be expected that business interests would seek to 
maintain the comfortable status quo.00 Similarly, much of the 
impetus toward passage of the Administrative Procedure Act in 
1946 came from business interests that were chafing under the 
extensive economic controls imposed during the Second World 
War.01 
It also seems evident that there were more idealistic reasons 
underlying the judicialization of administrative procedure. In the 
early debates over impermissible delegation of powers, and more 
recently, in those debates over the Administrative Procedure Act,92 
there is frequently expressed a very real concern that the power con-
ferred upon administrative decision makers would be abused, and 
that some form of accountability for the agencies, in addition to the 
constraints imposed by limited judicial review, should be provided. 
Thus, in 1945 the retiring President of the American Bar Associ-
ation voiced his support for the AP A in the following terms: 
89. Quoted in R. FELLMETH, supra note I, at xv. 
90. Cf. 51 CONG. R.Ec. 13,121 (1914) (remarks of Senator Reed during floor debates 
on the Federal Trade Commission Act): "I think it is true ••• that for a number of 
years the tendency of the Federal courts was too much in favor of great property inter-
ests. Why was that? It was, at least in part, because great interests had been able to 
control to some extent the appointment of Federal judges." 
Ironically, there are now many public interest groups, particularly in the environ-
mental field, who seek to preserve the status quo and prevent new business endeavors; 
as might be expected, environmentalists often seek the imposition of trial-type pro-
cedures, and a greater role for the courts. See text accompanying note 79 supra. 
91. For example, the National Association of Manufacturers issued a pamphlet in 
1945 entitled What Bureaucracy Means to You which urged support for administrative 
reform bills that would, inter alia: 
8. Restate the Principle which administrative agencies have seemed to forget, 
that a man is deemed innocent until he has been proven guilty; compel agencies 
to give him due notice of action; and force them to allow him full opportunity 
to be heard in his own behalf before he is judged. 
Then the individual citizen will be safe against "star chamber" proceedings. 
9. Compel agencies to base their decisions on evidence, not on surmise or con-
jecture, and to issue their decisions only after unbiased appraisal of all the 
evidence. 
One may, of course, question the depth and sincerity of NAM's interest in procedural 
rights for the "individual citizen"; it is clear, however, that the Association believed 
people were worried about bureaucratic power. This pamphlet was directed at the 
general public, urging citizens to write their congressmen in support of administrative 
reform. 
92. See generally LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, SEPARATION 
OF POWERS AND TIIE INDEPENDENT AGENCIES: CAsES AND SELECTED READINGS, s. Doc. No. 
49, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). 
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At some time this nation will surely stand at a crossroads which 
point one way to freedom and order, and the other way to bondage 
and chaos. Many people cite good reasons for saying that the day of 
choice is at hand. If we pass blindly on, we may find ourselves so 
used to bargaining rather than adjudication, and so accustomed to 
politics rather than legal administration, that we will neither recog-
nize nor appreciate a government according to Iaw.93 
Even discounting the excesses of rhetoric, it is obvious that this 
kind of sentiment has been-and continues to be-a primary force 
behind the "judicializing" of administrative procedure.94 In essence, 
it reflects a concern that administrative power cannot be readily 
fitted into the checks and balances inherent in a threefold division 
of government-a concern which was given classic expression by 
Justice Jackson in his dissenting opinion in FTC v. Ruberoid Co.:95 
The rise of administrative bodies probably has been the most 
significant legal trend of the last century and perhaps more values 
today are affected by their decisions than by those of all the courts, 
review of administrative decisions apart. They also have begun to 
have important consequences on personal rights .... They have be-
come a veritable fourth branch of the Government, which has de-
ranged our three-branch legal theories much as the concept of a 
fourth dimension unsettles our three-dimensional thinking. 
Courts have differed in assigning a place to these seemingly neces-
sary bodies in our constitutional system. Administrative agencies have 
been called quasi-legislative, quasi-executive or quasi-judicial, as the 
occasion required, in order to validate their functions within the sep-
aration-of-powers scheme of the Constitution. The mere retreat to 
the qualifying "quasi" is implicit with confession that all recognized 
classifications have broken down, and "quasi" is a smooth cover which 
we draw over our confusion as we might use a counterpane to con-
ceal a disordered bed. 96 
93. Address by David A. Simmons, Dec. 17, 1945, in ABA Administrative Law Com-
mittee, Government According to Law: Shall We Have It? (pamphlet, 1945). 
94. Occasionally, arguments are still made about the impermissible delegation of 
power to agencies, but the tone has become rather despairing. See, e.g., Keynote Address 
by R. Schotland before the Federal Trial Examiners' Conference, March 20-21, 1972, 
After 25 Years: We Come To Praise the APA and Not To Bury It, at 3-4: 
However courts may treat delegation when the validity of a statute is attacked 
••• [the issue] remains a live problem in statutory drafting and also for the dele-
~ees themselves. For at bottom the question of delegation is the question of assur-
mg democratic participation in, and controls over, the exercise of administrative 
power •••• 
Most recently, only Lloyd Cutler • • • has spoken out against the invalid dele-
gation in the wage-price freeze •••• We shonld ponder the silence with which 
we have accepted a delegation not only lacking in procedural safeguards, but con-
ferring immense powers on private persons who continue their private conflicting 
associations • • •• 
95. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 480 (1952). 
96. 343 U.S. at 487-88. 
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Granting the legitimacy of fears about bureaucratic power, how-
ever, why should trial-type procedures be used as a method of limit-
ing and controlling this power? One possible explanation can be 
found in Lon Fuller's notion that within particular societies, 
possible forms of social ordering are limited: if the society is con-
fronted with a difficult or novel problem, it may not have available 
an appropriately sophisticated ordering mechanism to deal ade-
quately with the interests that are at stake, and thus it will have to 
make do with existing systems.97 Consequently, forcing the task 
of administrative regulation into the ill-fitting mold of judicial 
procedure may be simply a stop-gap measure, symptomatic of a 
need to develop new and better decision-making methods. Several 
alternative models have been suggested in the literature recently; 
but before turning to them, we should attempt a formulation of the 
criteria that can be used to compare and evaluate different proce-
dural systems. 
III. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING PROCEDURAL SYSTEMS 
Undoubtedly, there are numerous criteria that could be em-
ployed to evaluate the merit of a particular procedural system and 
to compare the features of alternative systems.98 At the broadest 
level of generalization, however, most of the tests or factors seem to 
fit within three categories: accuracy, efficiency, and acceptability.99 
A. Accuracy of Decisions 
That accuracy of decisions is a system goal seems self-evident, 
but this concept has implicit within it a number of complex prob-
lems. Empirical research such as the New Jersey study of pretrial 
conferences100 indicates that procedural devices can have a marked 
97. The concept is developed in detail in Fuller, Irrigation· and Tyranny, 17 STAN. 
L. R.Ev. 1021 (1965). In analyzing the fact that ancient societies which built large-scale 
irrigation works usually had a despotic form of government, Fuller points out that 
most of these early societies lacked ordering alternatives such as contract, licensing, or 
a developed market economy that could have performed the function of allocating 
rights and obligations in the construction and use of irrigation systems. In light of 
prevailing social concepts, tyranny was a "logical" response to the problems created by 
the new technology. 
98. See, e.g., Rosenberg, Devising Procedures That Are Civil To Promote Justice 
That Is Civilized, 69 MICH. L. R.Ev. 797, 802-03 (1971). 
99. Cf. Cramton, Administration Procedure Reform: The Effects of S. 1663 on the 
Conduct of Federal Rate Proceedings, 16 AD. L. R.Ev. 108, 111-13 (1964). 
100. M. ROSENBERG, THE PRETRIAL CONFER.ENCE AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE (1964). The 
New Jersey experiment involved an effort to determine whether mandatory pretrial 
conferences in negligence cases would achieve greater efficiency at trial. The mandatory 
conferences failed to speed the disposition of cases as the experimenters had hoped; how-
ever, they did increase the amount of plaintiffs' recovery in comparison to the control 
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effect upon the outcome of a proceeding even when there is no 
apparent logical reason for the change in results; thus the question 
whether a certain type of procedure is conducive to accuracy should 
be answered by reference to the substantive regulatory policies that 
are being implemented.101 For example, trial procedures with their 
heavy emphasis on intensive and searching cross-examination as a 
method of finding truth may be more effective in exposing the nega-
tive features of a proposed action than in illuminating its positive 
virtues. If so, it would be possible to say that trial procedures are 
more "accurate" when implementing a policy that large-scale de-
velopment projects should be restrained in the face of uncertain 
environmental consequences, than they would be in implementing a 
policy that economic growth should go forward despite uncertainty. 
Another set of accuracy problems may be inherent in the in-
centives and pressures felt by regulators. A number of behavioral 
scientists who have studied organizational decision-making conclude 
that the administrator or executive who is confronted with a com-
plex problem tends to engage in a practice called "satisficing," or 
finding a solution that is "good enough" to satisfy his aspiration 
levels, despite the fact that he is supposed to be seeking an optimal 
trade-off among conflicting values.102 The recent Calvert Cliffs' 
case103 seems to illustrate this tendency quite clearly. In implement-
ing its new responsibilities under the National Environmental 
Policy Act, the Atomic Energy Commission promulgated rules which 
provided that the Commission would accept evidence of a license 
applicant's compliance with state water quality standards as satisfy-
ing the demands of environmental protection. The reviewing court, 
however, concluded that NEPA required a different kind of decision-
making. It stressed that the Act's goal is 
to ensure that each agency decision maker has before him and takes 
into proper account all possible approaches to a particular project 
... which would alter the environmental impact and the cost-benefit 
balance. Only in this fashion is it likely that the most intelligent, 
optimally beneficial decision will ultimately be made.104 
group of cases in which no conference was held. Id. at 28-29. See also Rosenberg, supra 
note 98, at 804-08. 
101. See Cramton, supra note 99, at 113: 
Existing substantive policies under each regulatory statute should not be inadver-
tently or intentionally distorted by procedural changes. Opponents of an agency's 
substantive policies .•• may sometimes seek to cripple the effective performance 
of regulation through the imposition of procedural restrictions. The purpose of 
procedural reform should be to improve the effectiveness of regulation, not to 
hobble it. 
102. See text accompanying notes 106-09 infra. 
103. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
104. 449 F.2d at 1114. 
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Thus, even when a proposed nuclear power plant met the relevant 
state water quality standard, it was possible that the over-all balance 
of economic and noneconomic factors would dictate a higher degree 
of environmental protection. This requirement of an optimizing 
approach has caused considerable dismay among concerned ob-
servers, and has led to claims that the court is demanding that the 
AEC accomplish the impossible.105 The behavioral scientists' 
analyses of "satisficing" and "optimizing" models tend to support 
this contention. 
On a theoretical level, it has been asserted that a true optimizing 
model requires a "single set of values against which possible future 
outcomes can be matched in order to establish the order of their 
desirability."106 However, environmental factors such as scenic, 
ecological, or historic values resist reduction to some common de-
nominator such as dollars. Moreover, even when a commonly 
accepted yardstick is available, such as profit in business decision, 
behavioral observations suggest that the decision maker still tends 
not to seek the optimal solution: 
First, he eliminates the scaling problem ... by reformulating multi-
valued goals into single-valued constraints. Instead of trying to maxi-
mize profit, the businessman chooses the first project he finds [that] 
will satisfy his profit requirement .... Second, he vastly simplifies the 
range of choice he faces by ignoring all relationships but the most 
evident. The result is that the constraints upon his choices are few 
and clear cut. He is able to routinize the choice activity and express 
general solutions to recurring categories of problems as "rules of 
thumb."101 
This tendency is generally attributed not so much to defects in 
the decision-making process as to limitations in human intellectual 
capacity and available information;108 however, it could be argued 
105. See note 4 supra and accompanying text. 
106. Bauer, The Study of Policy Formation: An Introduction, in R. BAUER &: K. 
GERGEN, THE STUDY OF POLICY FORMATION 1, 12 (1968) [hereinafter POLICY FORMATION]. 
107. Bower, Descriptive Decision- Theory from the "Administrative" Viewpoint, in 
POLICY FORMATION, supra note 106, at 103, ll6. 
108. See, e.g., Lindblom, supra note 31, at 155. 
It should be noted that the behavioral scientists differ considerably in their analyses 
of the extent to which an optimizing model is in fact attainable. Lindblom asserts that 
"[n]othing would be more paralyzing to an administrator than to take seriously the 
prescription • • • that he make no decision until he canvas all possible alternative 
ways of reaching well formulated goals, making sure that he has investigated every 
possible major consequence of each possible alternative." Lindblom, Contexts for 
Change and Strategy: A Reply, in READINGS, supra note 31, at 171, 172. 
On the other hand, other observers argue that decision makers do use an optimizing 
approach for complex probleins, albeit in simplified form, see F. KAsr &: J. ROSENZWEIG, 
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT: A SYSTEMS .APPROACH 407 (1970), or take the position 
that, although true optimization is largely unattainable, the use of an optimizing 
model improves the quality of decision by forcing decision makers to think seriously 
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that adjudication, which is suited to resolving controversies by 
applying general "rules of thumb" to particular facts, would enhance 
the natural tendency toward satisficing rather than optimizing. 
Thus, adjudicative procedures may decrease accuracy when the 
agency decision should approach the optimizing model.109 
A related phenomenon that may impair the accuracy of decision 
in polycentric controversies has been picturesquely described by 
commentators as "the dwarfing of soft variables. "110 That is, in 
broad cost-benefit analyses, certain factors are likely to have readily 
quantifiable values, such as a market price, while other factors such 
as ecological considerations will not. The existence of sophisticated 
mathematical models capable of manipulating the quantifiable 
variables may tempt the decision maker either to use the model 
beyond the bounds of its reliability by assigning arbitrary values to 
unquantifiable items,111 or to ignore "soft data" altogether: 
Equipped with a mathematically powerful intellectual machine, 
even the most sophisticated user is subject to an overwhelming temp-
tation to feed his pet the food it can most comfortably digest. Readily 
quantifiable factors are easier to process---and hence more likely to 
be recognized and then reflected in the outcome-than are factors 
that resist ready quantification. The result, despite what turns out to 
be a spurious appearance of accuracy and completeness, is likely to 
be significantly warped and hence highly suspect.112 
It seems open to question whether adjudicative procedures would 
enhance or inhibit this type of tendency toward inaccuracy. On the 
one hand, the tradition of putting the expert in the role of witness 
rather than decision maker and exposing him to searching, often 
hostile, cross-examination may help expose inaccuracies resulting 
about novel approaches to complex problems; Dror, Muddling Through-"ScieTl'Ce" or 
Inertia?, in READINGS, supra, at 166. 
109. Of course, this argument depends on the questionable assumption that 
optimizing approaches can produce better decisions than satisficing models. See note 
108 supra. If one takes the position that optimizing is an unrealizable and inherently 
inaccurate decision-making approach, then presumably nothing is lost-and perhaps 
something may be gained-by using a decision-making procedure that is incompatible 
with optimizing. 
110. Tribe, supra note 49, at 1361-62. 
111. Cf. R. DORFMAN, MEAsURING BENEFITS OF GoVERNMENT INVESTMENTS 8 (1965): 
Quite clearly, the precise formula used for consolidating and expressing the 
results of the [benefit-cost] analysis is a relatively superficial matter: properly inter-
preted all the formulas lead to the same conclusions. The heart of the matter lies 
m deciding what benefits should be included and how they should be valued. The 
debate about benefit-cost analysis centers on the question of whether the social 
value of benefits can be estimated reliably enough to justify the trouble and effort 
involved in a benefit-cost computation. 
112. Tribe, supra note 49, at 1361-62. 
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from the improper use of analytical models. At the same time, how-
ever, the use of a generalist decision maker and the pressure to 
formulate clearcut standards of decision may result in attributing a 
more conclusive effect to the expert's analytical model than is justi-
fied by the state of his knowledge.118 
Another accuracy-impairing phenomenon which is more familiar, 
at least to _Washington lawyers, has been called "the insider per-
spective."114 Government regulators know, or soon discover, that 
their decisions are monitored by a variety of affected constituencies, 
the most prominent of which include certain members of Congress, 
the executive branch, and the industry regulated by the agency. 
Agencies cannot risk offending or alienating their consituencies too 
deeply, for members of the constituencies can, at the least, make life 
very difficult for the agency. As a result, even the most conscientious 
regulators know that they cannot afford to "go to the mat" on every 
issue; rather, they must give ground on issues they feel to be of 
secondary importance to preserve their clout for what they regard 
as the crucial problems.115 In short, the incentive structure surround-
ing the agencies may support a tendency to favor the regulated in 
many instances by rewarding ineffective regulation and penalizing 
the agency for decisions that are based on pure accuracy considera-
tions.116 The use of an adjudicatory model might be expected to 
lessen the force of these pressures through the shielding effect of 
lll!. Cf. Korn, supra note 50, at 1092: 
Limitations within the state of knowledge of the expert's own discipline are an 
obvious source of error. There are wide variations both in the general level of 
certainty of the various sciences called upon in lawsuits and between the axiomatic 
and frontier areas of a given discipline ••.• 
The problem is aggravated by the need to apply the scientist's generalized 
knowledge to the multifarious, haphazard and often unique facts of particular 
cases. This process may involve such close questions of judgment that highly com-
petent and unbiased experts differ even if they have full and equal access to all 
available data, ••• 
ll4. The term is borrowed from J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT (1971), where 
the problem is analyzed in detail. 
ll5. Cf. id. at 53: "From the inside perspective of a government agency, hard 
choices must be made. An agency has its own priorities and legislative prograni; it has 
conflicting constituencies among which it must mediate, and in whose eyes it must-
for its own good-appear to have a balanced position; it has a budget to consider and 
thereby a need for friends in the legislature." 
ll6. R. NoLL, supra note 46, at 40-45: 
To a regulatory authority, one success indicator is a negative one-the failure of 
the courts or the Congress to override a decision by the regulators. A second suc-
cess indicator is continued operation of the regulated sector. 'Widespread service 
failure is likely to be blamed on the regulatory agency, and is therefore to be 
avoided, even if the cost exceeds the costs of the service failure ..•• 
• • • (B]y giving regulated firms a little more than they deserve, the agencies make 
certain that the most threatening group has something that could be lost in 
an appeal. In disputes between well-represented interests, the agency will, for the 
same reason, seek a compromise that gives something to all disputants, whether 
economic efficiency or the public interest would favor such a compromise. 
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relatively precise standards of decision and through the impetus 
toward consistency inherent in principles of stare decisis. However, 
as noted above, the importance of these countervailing factors is 
minimized by the interest-balancing approach used in adjudicating 
polycentric controversies.117 Nevertheless, adjudication still retains 
the insulating effect of having controversies decided on the record 
and of focusing on the facts of the particular case so that non-
parties will not perceive the decision as a direct threat to their 
interests.118 Thus, even in polycentric controversies, adjudicative 
procedure contains significant safeguards against undue political in-
fluence, and may accordingly protect the accuracy of agency decision-
making. 
Another threat to accuracy in administrative proceedings ap-
pears in the tendency for decision makers to inflate the past and de-
value the future. It has been observed that agency projects gather 
momentum as time, effort, and capital are invested in increasing 
quantities. Indeed, this phenomenon seems to appear even when the 
only investment has been analytical time.119 If substantially greater 
"sunk costs" are accumulated for one possible activity than for other 
117. Cf. Dixon, The Social Security Disability Program: A System in Crisis, Oct. 27, 
1971, at 16 (report to the Committee on Grant and Benefit Programs, ACUS): 
To be sure, nonadministerable standards are not new to government, and in some 
areas may be unavoidable, e.g., the "public interest" standard for grant of radio 
and television licenses. But in such areas the Congress is really merely transferring 
the political process to administrative hands. Because relatively small numbers of 
decisions are to be made, and individualized interests are not at stake, we expect 
no higher order of consistency than we ever expect from the political process. 
That expectation is pretty low-and should be-because in the political process 
we do not deal with questions of right and wrong. 
118. One commentator has suggested that these protective features are the major 
reasons for the NLRB's use of adjudication rather than rule-making: 
While other agencies have received some attention and criticism from Congress and 
the bar, the NLRB has been a whipping boy without rival, since it constantly 
decides the controversies of powerful groups with talented counsel, expert pub-
licists, and important political allies. One may surmise that the Board has reacted 
by adopting the mechanism least subject to attack-the decision of individual 
cases on the narrowest possible ground, riveted to the factual peculiarities of the 
particular proceeding • . . . On the other hand, the Board is afraid that rule 
making decisions would be rendered without elaborate fact-finding, and would 
focus explicitly on policy, thus bringing excessive attention from Congress, the 
most dangerous branch to bureaucrats. 
Bernstein, supra note 12, at 597-98. 
119. E.g., Bower, supra note 107, at 124: 
Analytical time almost always is the resource of a corporation that is subject to 
rationing. Furthermore, given common-as opposed to rational-thinking con-
cerning sunk costs, it becomes increasingly hard to reject a proposal as it absorbs 
analytical hours. The net result is that the capital-investment decision is effectively 
made by that middle manager who authorizes the study and writing needed for a 
project proposal. 
Cf. Noll, The Economics and Politics of Regulation~ 57 VA. L. REv. 1016, 1022 (1971): 
"Regulatory agencies abhor abandoning a capital investment ••. as long as it is in 
good working order and has not been fully depreciated by the owner." 
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alternatives within the initial range of acceptable choice, there is 
strong pressure to persist with the plan originally found superior 
even if it later becomes apparent that a different plan would have 
been initially preferable.120 Trial-type proceedings seem to provide 
little help in overcoming this kind of inertia, particularly when the 
evidentiary hearing is not held until a particular plan is substantially 
undenvay. In AEC nuclear reactor licensing, for example, differences 
among the staff, the applicant, and the Advisory Committee on Re-
actor Safeguards concerning safety features are worked out in an 
extended prehearing process that has been described as "bargain-
ing.''121 By the time that a trial-type hearing is held on the issuance 
of a construction permit and public intervenors are allowed to par-
ticipate, the parties to the negotiation are not likely to embrace 
alternatives that would require substantial revision of the plans they 
have worked so long to perfect. In this situation, it is not surprising 
to learn that intervenors often view the hearing as a "stacked deck" 
and resort to "no win" delaying tactics rather than trying to make 
useful contributions to the plan in question.122 
The corollary of this tendency to inflate the past is the adminis-
trative failure to assign sufficient weight to the future effects of pro-
posed action. This result may be caused in part by a propensity 
among organizations to avoid conditions of uncertainty by trying to 
120. If substantial sunk costs have been accumulated for the first project by the 
time that the advantages of an alternative plan are discovered, however, it may be 
economically more rational to go forward with the partially implemented plan instead 
of scrapping it and beginning anew. An analogous problem has arisen in the environ-
mental field because the National Environmental Policy Act does not contain any 
provision describing what should be done with respect to projects which were under-
way, but had not yet completed their progress through the agency decision-making 
process, on the Act's effective date. One approach has been to acknowledge that 
agencies can take account of resources already committed in weighing the alternatives 
then available. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 
1121 n. 28: 
A total reversal of the basic decision to construct a particular facility or take a 
particular action may then be difficult, since substantial resources may already have 
been committed to the project. Since NEPA must apply to the project in some 
fashion, however, it is essential that it apply as effectively as possible-requiring 
alterations in parts of the project to which resources have not yet been inalterably 
committed at great expense. 
121. Ellis & Johnston, Licensing of Nuclear Power Plants by the Atomic En-ergy 
Commission, April 1971, at 13-14 (report to the Chairman, ACUS). Similar phe-
nomena have been reported in Bureau of Reclamation decision-making on irrigation 
projects and in FDA food standards proceedings. See Smith, Environmental Decision 
Making at the Bureau of Reclamation, July 14, 1971, at 12-13 (report to the Executive 
Secretary, ACUS); Hamilton, supra note 5, at 45-46, 95-96. Cf. J. SAX, supra note 114, at 
102: "[T]he agencies' self-interest encourages them to confront the public with a fait 
accompli. Both public and private agencies are well aware of the benefits of surprise and 
of the weight that tends to be given the argument that much time, effort and money 
[have] already been invested in a proposal." (Emphasis original.) 
122. Ellis & Johnston, supra note 121, at 40-42. 
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"operate so as to provide short-run feedback rather than face the un-
certainty of long-range planning."123 Undoubtedly, it is also due to 
the fact that the short-run consequences will be most important to 
the powerful constituencies that shape an agency's activity. However, 
it also seems true that trial-type procedures can contribute to the 
agencies' relative indifference to long-range future effects of their 
decisions, since adjudication casts the decision maker into a passive 
"umpire" role, and makes it likely that the immediate, highly vocal 
claims of the regulated industry will prevail over the diffuse, long-
range and unrepresented interests of affected segments of the 
public.124 
A final facet of the administrative use of trial-type hearings sug-
gests that adjudication can be viewed as making an important con-
tribution to the accuracy of decisions reached at later stages of the 
proceeding or in the larger arena of general legislative policy formu-
lation, even though the immediate result of the hearing may not be 
particularly valuable. For example, the 1957 licensing amendments 
to the Atomic Energy Act125 required hearings regardless of whether 
any parties or intervenors were opposing issuance of the license, 
and, despite the persuasive objection that a trial-type hearing in the 
absence of disputed facts or issues is a doctrinal and logical absur-
dity,126 there was some substance to the belief that these hearings 
could improve the quality of the ultimate decision: 
In part it seems to have been felt that, given the newness of the 
[atomic] power program, members of the public might be insuffi-
ciently aware of their interest to respond to a notice of intention to 
license, so that a hearing was necessary to make them aware that 
their interests were affected. The dominant objective seems to have 
been to ensure that important AEC decisions would be made pub-
licly.121 
123. Bower, supra note 107, at 132-33. See also Noll, supra note 119, at 1022: "The 
second factor behind the general attitude of regulatory agencies towards technological 
change is the belief that regulators should reduce as much as possible the uncertainty 
faced by regulated firms." Perhaps this notion of feedback and uncertainty helps to ex-
plain why the agencies continue to rely heavily on adjudication, despite the com-
mentators' frequent exhortations that they use rule-making. 
124. See, e.g., R. NOLL, supra note 46, at 80: 
[A)s regulation has developed, regulatory agencies have behaved more like neutral, 
passive judges of the conflict of interests among firms in, or touched by, regulated 
industry .... The procedural safeguards for the regulated firms affect the flow of 
information to the passive judgmental body, giving that body an impression of 
the regulatory environment that is overly favorable to regulated interests. 
125. Pub. L. 85-256 § 7, 71 Stat. 579, amending 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (1970). 
126. See Davis, Nuclear Facilities Licensing: Another View, 110 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 371 
(1962). 
127. Murphy, Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards: An Experiment in Administra-
tive Decision Making on Safety Questions, 33 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 556, 574 (1968), 
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A similar rationale for the use of adjudicative procedures is found 
in Joseph Sax's belief that judicial review is particularly valuable 
for polycentric environmental issues because it provides time for 
environmentalists to seek an ultimate resolution through the politi-
cal process and offers a means of focusing legislative attention on the 
problem.128 If this is a valid proposition for judicial review, it should 
also be true, although to a lesser extent, with respect to administra-
tive trial-type hearings. In other words, the existence of a trial-type 
proceeding may contribute to a more accurate political resolution of 
the problem by forcing affected interests to ponder the issues and 
articulate their preferences. 
In short, then, accuracy is a subtle problem that can be ap-
proached from many perspectives, and analytic results will depend 
largely upon how one characterizes the objective of the proceedings. 
Moreover, barring the rare situations in which testing, experiment, 
or other scientific techniques can provide an irrefutable answer, ac-
curacy is a relative goal. The question is not whether administrative 
trial-type hearings are an accurate form of decision-making, but, 
rather, whether they are more or less accurate than some other pro-
cedural form. 
B. Efficiency in Decision-Making 
The criterion of efficiency reflects the general proposition that 
decision-making objectives should be attained at the least possible 
cost to avoid waste of scarce social resources. Initially, efficiency dic-
tates a careful assessment of how much accuracy is needed for a 
particular type of decision, for the cost of deciding may increase 
sharply as accuracy requirements are raised. For example, in resolv-
ing scientific or technical issues, it is possible that the cost of decision-
making will double if it is necessary to go from an eighty per cent to 
a ninety per cent certainty that a particular event will or will not 
occur. Once the threshold question of level of accuracy is resolved 
and it is determined which procedural features are necessary to assure 
that the decisional process will be acceptable to affected constituen-
cies, the efficiency criterion dictates that continuing efforts be made 
to find quicker and cheaper ways to satisfying these objectives. 
Trial procedures are undeniably an expensive means of deciding 
128. J. SAX, supra note 114, at xviii: 
Courts are not to be used as substitutes for the legislative process-to usurp 
policies made by elected representatives-but as a means of providing realistic 
access to legislatures so that the theoretical processes of democracy can be made to 
work more effectively in practice. Citizen initiatives in the courts can be used to 
bring important matters to legislative attention, to force them upon the agendas 
of reluctant and busy representatives. 
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polycentric issues. Even proponents of adversary processes point out 
that litigation "is relatively extravagant in the time it is willing to 
invest in letting interested persons state, be tested on, and restate 
their positions."129 Whether adjudication is also inefficient is, of 
course, a different question. Many commentators, including former 
regulatory commissioners,130 have criticized various inefficiencies of 
the adjudicative hearing. More recently, their complaints have been 
adopted by members of regulated industries who have found that 
trial procedures can be used by public intervenors to increase enor-
mously the cost and complexity of proceedings.131 On the other hand, 
many experienced practitioners and agency personnel believe that 
the properly conducted trial-type hearing, with its direct, immediate 
confrontation of opposing interests and its ability to focus precisely 
and in depth on the "gut issues" of a controversy, is often the quick-
est and easiest route to a good solution.132 Unfortunately, there has 
been little attempt to discuss the admittedly difficult problems of 
whether various proposed reforms in decision-making would really 
improve efficiency substantially, and whether they might impair 
either the accuracy or acceptability of the system. Further under-
standing in these areas probably will have to await the application 
of sophisticated statistical techniques.133 
C. Acceptability of Procedures 
An important, yet relatively amorphous, aspect of any decision-
making process is that it must be acceptable-that is, perceived as 
legitimate-both to those who are directly affected by agency deci-
129. Id. at 221. 
130. E.g., Elman, supra note 43, at 653-54; Hector, supra note 75. 
131. See, e.g., Address by William F. Kennedy, Associate General Counsel, General 
Electric Co., before the ABA-ALI Program on Atomic Energy Regulation, Nov. 13, 
1971, Nuclear Electric Power and the Environment-New Regulatory Structures and 
Procedures, at 11: 
The number of issues now available for contest under NEPA and the Atomic Energy 
Act is nearly endless; between them, the Atomic Energy Act and the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act contemplate that many of these issues will be litigated in a 
trial-type proceeding with a whole apparatus of devices which can be manipulated 
to produce years-long delay-prolonged discovery, preheating conferences, numer• 
ous pre-trial motions, appeals from decisions on motions, objections to evidence, 
rulings on evidence, extended cross-examination, briefs, intermediate decisions, 
exceptions to intermediate decisions, briefs on appeal, etc., etc. This is not all; 
some issues can now be litigated before one tribunal- and relitigated before another, 
and the same issue can be tested over and over again plant-by-plant-by-plant. 
132. See, e.g., Zwerdling, supra note 62. 
133. The Administrative Conference currently is considering a proposed statistical 
project, which would attempt to measure administrative delay and performance, in an 
effort to establish correlations between particular procedural devices and undue delay. 
See generally Nagel, Measuring Unnecessary Delay in Administrative Proceedings: The 
Actual Versus the Predicted, PouCY SCIENCES, March 1972, at 81. 
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sions and to the general public as well.134 In part, acceptability may 
correspond to the other criteria since, on the whole, people want the 
government to make decisions efficiently and accurately. Beyond this, 
however, considerations of acceptability raise complex questions of 
political theory regarding the exercise of governmental power that 
are the subject of both scholarly and political debate.135 Therefore, 
only a few general observations concerning the acceptability of ad-
judicative procedures will be made here. 
As noted above, the use of adjudicative procedures can be viewed 
as an important method of limiting bureaucratic power. First, many 
of the important stages of adjudicative procedures take place on the 
public record and are thus open to public scrutiny. At the same time, 
there is institutional pressure to base the decision solely on record 
material that is presented to a passive decision maker who has little 
direct control over the content of the evidence he receives.136 There 
is also the pressure toward consistency that results from the need to 
build upon prior case law and the deterrent implicit in the possi-
bility of having the administrative decision reversed by a court or 
legislature. Finally, there is-at least in theory-a check upon the 
tribunal's policy-making power because the agency is required to 
1!14. Cf. Bauer, supra note 106, at 13: "Even a dictator can only, at best, defer 
negotiation. It is true that he may be able to impose his will for a long time, perhaps 
even for the duration of his life. But to the extent that his policies do not build him 
a base of support, he will have to spend organizational resources to maintain his 
position." 
135. For example, an interesting theoretical approach is Robert Dahl's development 
of the "criterion of personal choice." Dahl posits that the most acceptable type of 
decision is personal choice; however, since it is clearly impossible to realize personal 
choice in many situations arising in a mass society, the best alternative is a democratic 
system that assures some participation in the decisional process, either directly or 
through representatives. At the same time, however, there are many situations in which 
a rational person will prefer that important decisions affecting his interests be made 
by a person or group possessing a particular skill or special competence. The adminis• 
trative decision evidences a tension between these objectives: 
[I]n order to be effective representative bodies need to delegate authority still 
further to administrative bodies .•.. When members of a democratic body delegate 
some of its authority in order to effectuate their purposes, they will want to insure 
that the authority is employed for the purposes they have in mind. Delegated 
authority is subordinate authority. In this sense, delegated authority entails 
hierarchy. And the more dangerous the authority, or the more open it is to abuse, 
the stronger we may want the controls within the hierarchy to be. 
R. DAHL, AFTER THE REvoLUTION? 94 (1970). See also id. at 8-10. 
136. Cf. Cinderella Career &: Finishing Schools, Inc. v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583, 588-89 
(D.C. Cir. 1970): 
[W]hen a proceeding which involves sixteen days, 1,810 pages of testimony, 
fifty-two witnesses, and 247 exhibits, has been established, the Commissioners are 
not free to boil over in aggression and completely distniss those proceedings [on 
appeal] either because they are dissatisfied with the outcome, or for any other 
reason .••• The result, legally, is a ragged and confusing mosaic defying the very 
archetype of due process, abandoning the merit in hearings of the power of per-
suasion for the persuasion of power • • • . 
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implement the policies established by the legislature. Because poly-
centric issues place strains on the adjudicative process, they may also 
defeat the purpose of these checks. This phenomenon is not readily 
apparent, and so there may be no impairment of acceptability; how-
ever, critics are beginning to suggest that the appearance of objec-
tivity and fairness that results from use of trial procedures is a dan-
gerous fiction that obscures the essentially political nature of much 
regulatory activity and therefore dilutes any efforts to exercise more 
effective oversight through the political process.137 
Another value that can be perceived in the trial process arises 
from the pervasive American belief that individuals and organiza-
tions have a fundamental right to participate in the decision of issues 
that affect their well-being. Adjudication guarantees this right to 
participate at all important stages of the decisional process; more-
over, because adjudicative decision-making takes place on the public 
record and employs a reasoning process of applying principles to 
facts, the parties have assurance that their participation will be 
meaningful. Finally, there seem to be other intangible values in-
herent in trial procedures: private litigants may gain satisfaction 
from having the right to force agencies to come forward and formally 
justify their positions,138 and there may even be psychological bene-
fits in the "battle atmosphere" of adversary litigation.139 However, to 
137. E.g., Reich, supra note 25, at 1237-38: 
When it is used in areas of policy making, [judicialized] procedure serves 
primarily to preserve the mythology about how government operates. It prevents 
us from seeing resource allocation as a process by which some are punished and 
others rewarded for reasons which have no relation to objective merits but have 
relation only to government policy. It preserves the appearance of the rule of law, 
making it seem that the immensely important allocation and planning process 
is being carried out at all times subject to fair and equitable guiding principles. 
Cf. R. NoLL, supra note 46, at 33: "[M]ost analysts believe that the independent regula-
tory agency was the creature of several pervasive and rather naive political attitudes 
running deep in American society. First is the general distrust of the political system 
coupled with a faith in nonpolitical expert judgments." 
138. Cf. J. SAX, supra note 114, at 57: 
[I]he availability of a judicial forum is a measure of the willingness of government 
to subject itself to challenge on the merits of decisions made by public officials; to 
accept the possibility that the ordinary citizen may have usefnl ideas to contribute 
to the effectuation of the public interest; and to submit to them if-in the rigorous 
process of fact gathering-those ideas are shown to have substantial merit, • • • 
[Litigation] is in many circumstances the only tool for genuine citizen participation 
in the operative process of government, 
See also note 5 supra. 
139. Cf. J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 376 (1949): 
Goitein suggests that the ceremonial of the court-room contest, with its vestiges 
of the ancient ordeal, have immense emotional value for litigants .••• The formal 
court process we now employ does sometimes yield emotional satisfaction to a 
litigant which he would not receive from a decision based on a less formal deter-
mination of the facts .••• [P]erhaps, also, [the public] emotionally craves a de-
cisional process which includes some ceremonial rites. 
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the extent the critics are correct in asserting that trial procedures 
are simply inappropriate for the resolution of polycentric issues, ad-
judicative hearings can become what Jerome Frank has called "verbal 
legal magic," which is used like magic in primitive communities "to 
end the uneasiness which a man would experience in the presence of 
disconcerting phenomena, to supply him with grounds for expecting 
victories over the causes of his fright."140 In other words, resort to 
the familiar and comforting rituals of trial proceedings may reflect 
a transformation of the wish that adjudication would accomplish a 
number of diverse and conflicting social objectives into the belief 
that it actually does so.141 A comparison may be made to the use of 
trials in the middle ages for relief against pestilence, rats, toads, 
witches, and bad neighbors.142 
Thus, while in some respects trial-type hearings appear to be a 
desirable form of social ordering for polycentric controversies, it is 
obvious that they are not generally accepted as ideal. The time is 
ripe for investigation and experimentation designed to determine 
whether there are alternative forms of decision-making which would 
preserve many of the virtues of administrative adjudication, while 
avoiding its more serious vices. In recent years, a formidable amount 
of nonlegal literature has developed on the theory and practice of 
In spite of all the foregoing, I surmise that, by and large, most litigants do 
want the courts to discover the true facts in their cases. 
A number of interesting questions and probletns for the social scientists can be 
imagined. For example, is this kind of catharsis a greater factor when the opposing 
party is some impersonal institution like "the government" or "the bureaucracy"? 
Is cross•examination of expert witnesses more satisfying because people tend to distrust 
expertise and dislike being in the control of one with specialized knowledge? Is the 
battle atmosphere of trial proceedings truly cathartic, in the sense of relieving tensions 
and aggressions that would otherwise find more destructive outlets, or does it instill 
an aggressive approach to problems that is incompatible with the need to compromise 
and cooperate in the vast majority of interpersonal contacts? 
14-0. Id. at 62. 
141. See id.: 
I trust the reader will understand what I mean by designating as "magical" the 
statements of the legal thinkers I have been quoting. The statements are not 
based upon actual observation. And yet they are not deliberate falsifications. 
These assertions concerning the efficacy of the legal rules are reached by the 
wish-route; they derive not from experience but from wishes. . .• 
. • • They want to believe that their desires are realized. Instead of saying, 
"This is what I wish would happen in court," they say, "This is what usually does 
happen in court." They run away from a close inspection of the actual legal 
world, because such inspection would compel them to confess to themselves that 
that world does not meet their desires. 
142. F. HEER, THE MEDIEVAL WoRLD 38 (1962). However, Warner Gardner has 
pointed out in commenting on an earlier draft of this paper that in our society witches 
and toads have ceased to be a social problem, and the ravages of rats and pestilence 
are generally held in check today; bad neighbors apparently constitute a more intract-
able problem, since people still resort to the courts for relief. Perhaps, in the long 
run, administrative trial-type hearings will compile an equally impressive record. 
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organizational decision-making, literature which often contains ex-
otic nomenclature describing decision-making mechanisms such as 
"the Delphi techniques," "the cross-impact matrix technique," and 
"the iteration-through-synopsis scenario."143 Many lawyers, and even 
a few practitioners of the arts that generate this kind of terminol-
ogy, 144 tend to dismiss such phrases as annoying jargon at best, and 
dishonest salesmanship at worst. Nonetheless, there are several basic 
concepts in the behavioral sciences which are deserving of lawyers' 
attention. 
IV. .ALTERNATIVES TO TRIAL-TYPE PROCEDURES 
Possible alternatives to agency adjudication seem to fall into two 
classes: "management models" and "consensual models."145 The 
management approach relies upon the value of expertise and in-
formal methods in decision-making rather than fostering public 
participation; consensual methods, on the other hand, depend upon 
heavy involvement of affected constituencies and tend to emphasize 
the social policy aspects of decision-making rather than the technical 
complexities of a problem. 
A. The Management Model 
Managerial decision-making is often proposed as a model for the 
agencies, but seldom explored in sufficient detail to warrant much 
confidence that the business world has a readily available answer to 
administrative malaise. Probably the best description of how man-
agement methods could be adapted to agency handling of polycen-
tric problems has been provided by Louis Hector: 
A well-run Government agency or military command or business 
would handle a project like [the CAB's Seven States route investi-
gation] by first blocking out the boundaries of the problem, making 
a few broad policy decisions at the top level, and then designating a 
143. H. LANFORD, TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING METHODOLOGIES 20, 22, 24 (1972). 
144. See, e.g., C. PErERS & T. BRANCH, BLOWING THE WHISTLE 129 (1972), where a 
consultant in "the urban problems industry" describes the terminology used by the 
professional seeker of government grants: 
[P]roposal writers have developed an amazingly useless vocabula;y. Etymologi-
cally, its roots trace to early McNamaran and to the nonsense words· of virtually 
every discipline. Such terms as "delivery systems," "interface," "stochastic," "mean-
ingful analysis," "empirical," "heuristic," "feasibility,'' "time frames," "indicators," 
"decisionflows," and "alternative system models" roll on through the proposals. 
145. Cf. Bauer, supra note 106, at 13: 
In the absence of any method of determining a "best" public policy (even in 
principle), there are but two alternatives for selection of policies. The first is 
the delegation to or usurpation of this task by some small group of persons. The 
other possibility is negotiation among interested parties to arrive at some policy 
sufficiently satisfactory to enough of them so that they can or will impose it on 
the others. 
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project director or chief of staff in charge of planning. The director 
would assemble the necessary personnel, divide up the research, set 
up a system of supervision, provide for necessary coordination, and 
within a few months have all the basic data in hand. This would be 
processed and systematized by a planning group which would pull 
together the outlines of a program in conformity with general poli-
cies already established. If more facts were needed, they would be 
secured. As problems arose they would go to the project director who 
would refer on to the top policy group any new major policy issues 
.... By the time the plan was finished, the staff, the project director 
and the policy makers would all be in substantial agreement, and 
final approval would follow swiftly.146 
The first thing that should be noted about this discussion is that it 
is glibly vague with respect to some of the most important problems 
of agency decision-making. What kind of "broad policy decisions at 
the top level" should be made preliminarily? How are the needed 
facts to be secured? Who makes the decisions regarding which prob-
lems are to be "bucked" up the hierarchy to the "project director" 
or the "top policy group"? Moreover, the description is completely 
silent on the question whether the model contemplates the possibil-
ity that affected interest groups or members of the general public 
are to have any direct input into either the fact-securing or policy-
deciding functions. 
Beyond these criticisms, it is clear that the management model 
loses a great deal when it is transplanted wholesale from the business 
world to the sphere of public regulation. In the business world, if the 
market is functioning properly, there is a built-in check against bad 
decisions: a company that is either wrong or inefficient a dispropor-
tionate number of times will lose out in the competitive race, and 
either shape up or go under. There is little evidence that the pres-
sure of congressional, executive, and public scrutiny has a compara-
ble impact in forcing agencies either to make drastic reforms or to 
close up shop when they err or waste public resources too frequently. 
Moreover, the competitive market's check on business error or in-
efficiency is premised on the belief-at least in theory-that poor 
decisions and failures of individual firms are socially tolerable. A 
similar approach would lead to absurd results in many areas of 
agency decision-making. Illustratively, one could scarcely defend the 
proposition that the Atomic Energy Commission should be left alone 
to do whatever it sees fit with respect to the safety of nuclear reactors 
because a few nuclear disasters would in all likelihood lead to a dis-
mantling of the AEC. 
146. Hector, supra note 75, at 932-33. 
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A distinction between the business decision and the agency de-
termination also exists in regard to matters internal to the organiza-
tion. In the corporation, the individual is highly motivated to assure 
that he and his subordinates are both accurate and efficient in re-
solving problems within their jurisdiction: if they are not, he will 
quite likely be summarily demoted or dismissed. This approach, of 
course, is hardly practicable or desirable for the great majority of 
civil service employees. Moreover, the profit motive provides a busi-
ness organization with a definite and agreed-upon goal against which 
to measure the relative desirability of alternative courses of action.147 
In administrative policy-making, conflicting and elusive goals must 
be balanced in the decision-making process, and the trade-offs among 
different plans are consequently far more problematical. Even when 
the agency is able to derive some general figure reflecting the net 
benefit of a proposed action, it still must take account of considera-
tions of equity and distributive justice-factors which the business 
decision maker is free to ignore.148 Also, the business world has avail-
able a number of readily quantified market, economic, and account-
ing indicators that can be used in setting goals and evaluating per-
formance. Polycentric issues arising in the administrative context are 
hardly susceptible to this kind of easy monitoring, since many of the 
factors that must enter the decision are essentially unquantifiable. 
It is interesting to note that, despite these distinguishing features, 
the management model already has a fairly close government ana-
147. See Zeckhauser & Schaefer, Public Policy and Normative Economic Theory, in 
POLICY FORMATION, supra note 106, at 27, 46: 
The primary value of the price system is that it summarizes information in a 
form which can be readily conveyed to decision-makers throughout the econ-
omy •••• 
In the absence of a price system we find it difficult to establish consistency 
between different decisions. Yet policy decisions must continually be made that 
involve items that are not traded on any economic market, or for which explicit 
prices do not exist. If there is a divergence between the implicit valuations dif-
ferent decision-makers place on these items, we are in a sub-optimal position; it 
would be possible to carry out changes that satisfy the Pareto critenon. 
148. Cf. G. BLACK, THE .APPLICATION OF SYSI'EMS .ANALYSIS TO GOVERNM'.ENT OPERA· 
TIONS 67 (1968): 
From the point of view of national welfare ••• costs that are merely shifted 
are not avoided. This points to a fundamental difference between costing in support 
of private and public systems analysis. Comparisons of costs in systems analysis 
which seek to identify a socially optimum system should take as costs the value 
of all resources used to achieve an output, regardless of where the burden of those 
costs should fall. To be sure, rates of taxation, fees, and subsidies should be de-
signed .•• so that the sum of direct private costs plus these transfer charges equals 
social cost and in seeking private profit, the maximum social benefit is also ob-
tained. Not infrequently, there is technically no way to achieve this result, and even 
where there is, there may be political and social objections. A compromise with the 
desire to optimize may be necessary, in the interests of equity-a less than opti-
mum system may be considered a fairer system. 
(Emphasis original.) 
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Iogue in the Army Corps of Engineers' water resources projects.149 
"[T]he boundaries of the problem" have been "blocked out" by the 
congressional directive that sets forth the cost-benefit analysis that 
must be applied to a proposed project.150 The first "broad policy 
decision at the top" is the Congressional Public Works Committees' 
authorization for a survey of the proposed project, which is generally 
made in the committees' executive session. The project then be-
comes the responsibility of a district engineer, who fills the role de-
scribed by Hector as "project director." Once funding is obtained, 
the district engineer undertakes a survey of the project site to get 
"all the basic data in hand"; however, this project takes, not a "few 
months" as Hector projected for large-scale CAB route investiga-
tions, but an average of four and a half years. During this survey 
period, the district engineer performs the functions of "supervision" 
and "necessary coordination" primarily through a series of "check-
point conferences" at which "staff assess their information on a par-
ticular subject and make choices." 
The next step in Hector's model is that the basic data are "pro-
cessed and systematized by a planning group which would pull 
together the outlines of a program in conformity with general poli-
cies already established." The Corps of Engineers approximates this 
function through a sequential and hierarchical scheme rather than 
the "horizontal" group apparently contemplated by Hector. The dis-
trict engineer prepares a draft solution and impact statement, which 
is circulated to interested governmental bodies and then reviewed 
by the division engineer, the Board of Rivers and Harbors, the Office 
of the Chief of Engineers, the Office of the Secretary of the Army, 
and the Office of Management and Budget. This ladder of review 
could also be considered as fulfilling the function described in Hec-
tor's model of funneling unforeseen major questions up the hier-
archy to the policy makers. "Final approval," or congressional au-
thorization for construction, does "follow swiftly" in the majority of 
cases, and apparently continues with minimal questioning through-
out the subsequent funding stages. 
Is this analogue to the management model an efficient, accurate 
system? At last count, "[t]he average Corps project consumes nearly 
18 years from inception to completion."151 Moreover, the seemingly 
149. The description in text of Corps procedure is taken from a tentative staff 
memorandum prepared for the Administrative Conference during the summer of 1971, 
on file with the Michigan Law Review. 
150. S. Doc. No. 97, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). 
151. Memorandum, supra note 149, at 5. 
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businesslike cost-benefit ratio employed in decision-making has been 
criticized as "invalid and misleading,''152 based on erroneous eco-
nomic theory,153 and dominated in its formulation by those who 
stand to gain more from a larger project.154 And, if economic criticism 
of the Corps' decision-making has been sharp, the environmentalists' 
accusations have been truly vitriolic.155 Even the behavioral scientists 
have attacked the type of cost-benefit decision-making employed by 
the Corps as being ill conceived.156 
While it would be unfair to conclude that all of these problems 
result from inherent defects in managerial decision-making, it never-
theless seems clear that government use of management models can 
152. 0. ECKSTEIN, WATER R.EsOURCE DEVELOPMENT, THE ECONOMICS OF PROJECT 
EVALUATION 41, 48 (1958): 
When a dam creates a lake, agencies look to the total expenditures which 
people make on fishing and swimming. But these expenditures are for travel, 
equipment, lodging, and so forth, and are not expenditures for the lake. A proper 
measure of benefit would be to indicate how much managers of the lake could 
collect in the form of user charges; since there are no charges for use of reservoirs 
or comparable bodies of water elsewhere, appropriate prices cannot be found • 
. . • Measuring all benefits and costs "to whomsoever they may accrue" is not only 
beyond the present ability of economic science, but presents conceptual d.ifliculties 
which by their very nature can never be overcome except by making very specific 
assumptions on matters about which the [Flood Control Act of 1936, 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 70la-f, 701h (1970)] does not prescribe. 
See also Zeckhauser &: Schaefer, supra note 147, at 69, 
It should also be noted that some commentators have concluded that cost-benefit 
analysis is likely to be more accurate in evaluating water resource projects than in 
other areas of governmental decision-making. See R. DoRFMAN, supra note 111, at 8. 
153. Fox&: Herfindahl, supra note 44, at 201: 
It is the expressed policy of the federal water resources agencies to undertake 
only those activities and increments thereof for which the incremental benefits 
exceed the incremental costs. That is, the benefit-cost ratio, assuming proper mea-
surement of alternative costs, must be over one for the whole project and for each 
of its subprojects .••• 
A proper application of the marginal principle requires something more, how-
ever: marginal net benefits must be zero. This means that it must not be possible 
to increase total net benefits by making the size of the project larger or smaller. 
154. Id. at 200: 
It is abundantly clear that those who benefit from federal water resources 
projects dominate the investment decision. The primary restraint is the profes-
sional integrity of the agency personnel who plan the project. . • • It is quite 
possible that the major departure from efficiency in federal water resources pro-
grams stems from optimistic estimates of benefits and the neglect of cheaper 
alternatives by consaentious federal employees who unfortunately function in a 
system in which most of the pressures are in one direction. 
155. See, e.g., G. MARINE, AMERICA THE RAPED: THE ENGINEERING MENTALITY AND 
THE DEVASrATION OF A CONTINENT (1969). 
156. Bauer, supra note 106, at 9: 
[F]or complex problems involving large numbers of interested parties the concept 
of a single best solution is misleading. Quantitative techniques of decision making 
are of great value in solving many problems; however, they offer little prospect 
of serving as an impartial, irrefutable arbiter of the conflicts of interest involved 
in large policy problems. 
See also text accompanying notes 106-09 supra. 
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be criticized as not meeting the criteria of accuracy, efficiency, and, 
most particularly, acceptability. The problems of checks, safeguards, 
and effective oversight to control bureaucratic power have not been 
effectively answered in the past by proponents of managerial deci-
sion-making, and seem more pressing today in light of recent contro-
versies surrounding government procurement and failures of large 
corporations subject to governmental supervision. However, even if 
general reliance on business decision-making methods would create 
problems for federal agencies, there still may be more limited man-
agerial practices and concepts that could usefully be employed in a 
wider range of administrative decisions. 
One proven technique that may have great potential for improv-
ing the accuracy of administrative decisions is the use of spot checks 
as a quality-control device. The obvious areas for a spot-check ap-
proach are programs with a high volume of relatively uncomplicated 
individual cases, such as income tax returns or claims of entitlement 
to welfare benefits, but it seems likely that this technique also could 
be used to single out certain areas of complex polycentric problems 
for intensive examination. One commentator has noted that the 
Atomic Energy Commission's licensing boards use a similar approach 
in uncontested cases to assess the safety of atomic reactors, with ap-
parently good results: 
The work [of the boards] is designed, essentially, to spot-check 
the work of the applicant and the staff. The areas checked tend 
to vary with the type of reactor and the interest of the particular 
board members. Where the reactor involves a departure from previ-
ous practice . . . questions are apt to relate to the new feature. 
Otherwise they are apt to relate to areas within the special com-
petence of the Board members, which are thought to pose safety 
problems .... [T]he objective is generally ... to test the applicant's 
and the staff's understanding of and handling of specific prob-
lems .... 
. . . . [This approach] reflects the feeling that-apart from its public 
information function-about all the hearing can accomplish is to 
make the staff and the applicant do their homework.157 
A similar suggestion is that the Army Corps of Engineers' managerial 
157. Murphy, supra note 127, at 582-83. See also Davis, supra note 126, at 374-75: 
If extra care and thoroughness, further checking, additional reviewing, or special 
supervision of staff is required because of the importance of the safety problems 
to the public ••• then I would have management engineers, not lawyers, help 
the Commission work out the procedures. • • . [!']he safeguards will not be cross• 
examination and rebuttal evidence-they are more likely to be checks, double 
checks, checklists, supervision methods, written records of each step taken or not 
taken, and the like. 
156 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:111 
decision-making could be improved by providing an independent 
"auditing unit" that would periodically monitor planning activities 
by examining in detail the estimates and data employed.158 
However, there are risks of inaccuracy in any spot-check ap-
proach, and these risks may be more substantial when spot-checking 
is applied to polycentric controversies. A valid spot-check or quality-
control system must be designed so that those who are being moni-
tored will not be able to "beat the system" by anticipating which 
actions will be checked. For example, if it were generally known that 
the Internal Revenue Service would audit only those tax returns 
filed by individuals whose social security numbers ended in three 
even numbers, the utility of the auditing device would be greatly 
diminished, to say the least. When there are many small, basically 
similar actions to be taken, as in the tax return or welfare benefit 
situation, it is relatively easy to provide sufficient randomness in the 
spot-checking operation; in the polycentric controversy, on the other 
hand, it may not be possible to divide complex problems into dis-
crete, fungible subunits. Moreover, it has been noted that any spot-
check or quality-control system must take account of the natural 
tendency to focus evaluation on those output factors that are easily 
quantified, and this in turn distorts organizational aims toward out-
put of the measurable factors.159 The "soft variables" in a polycentric 
issue may receive insufficient weight under a spot-check approach. 
A related body of knowledge that attempts to apply managerial 
techniques to governmental decision-making is the recent literature 
on "technology assessment." The basic goal of technology assessment 
is to provide early warning of the kinds of social, economic, and 
physical changes that can be caused by the introduction of new 
technologies, together with a decision-making apparatus that will 
enable government to structure and direct those changes from the 
earliest possible time. In essence, technology assessment seeks to deal 
with cases of extreme polycentricity-situations in which neither 
the details of a new technology, nor the range of its probable applica-
158. Fox &: Herfindahl, supra note 44, at 206. 
159. E.g., A. ETZIONI, MODERN ORGANIZATIONS 9-10 (1964): 
Frequent measuring can distort the organizational efforts because, as a rule, some 
aspects of its output are more measurable than the others. Frequent measuring 
tends to encourage over-production of highly measurable items and neglect of the 
less measurable areas . • . • 
The distortion consequences of overmeasuring are larger when it is impossible 
or impractical to quantify the more central, substantive output of an organiza-
tion •••• 
See also text accompanying notes 110-13 supra. 
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tion, nor the identity of potentially affected interests can be deter-
mined with any significant degree of certainty.160 
Technology assessment literature parallels the commentaries on 
cost-benefit analysis in counseling increased skepticism and caution as 
one moves farther away from situations in which market indicators 
such as price, output, and demand are available.161 While efforts have 
been made to develop "market surrogates" which would provide 
plausible quantification where none now exists, these analytical 
models are not yet considered sufficiently reliable to warrant ex-
tensive use.162 As a result, commentators in the field of technology 
assessment have usually resorted to formulating guides for making 
decisions in areas of extreme uncertainty. 
A common tenet of technology assessment is that, when con-
fronted with uncertainty, the decision maker should attempt to pre-
serve his options; in effect, the historical practice of imposing the 
"burden of uncertainty" on those who oppose the introduction of a 
new technology is reversed.163 The goal of preserving options die-
160. See Katz, Decision-Making in the Production of Power, SCIENTIFIC .AMERICAN, 
SepL 1971, at 191, 192: 
Technology assessment seeks to take advantage of the variety of options to 
increase benefits and reduce costs. It has two main components. The first is a 
systematic comparative appraisal of the first-order effects of technology (electric 
power [for example] , •• ) in relation to the visible, discoverable and foreseeable 
side effects (air pollution, heating of streams or lakes and possible radioactive 
hazards in the present context). The second component is a search through the 
full range of technological possibilities for the one best designed to achieve the 
desired first-order effect while eliminating or minimizing the undesirable side 
effects. 
See also HOUSE COMM, ON SCIENCE AND AsmoNAUTICS, 91st CONG., 1st SESS., REPORT OF 
THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES; TECHNOLOGY: PROCESSES OF AsSESSMENT AND CHOICE 
20 (Comm. Print 1969) [hereinafter AssEssMENT AND CHOICE]. 
161. See, e.g., AssESSMENT AND CHOICE, supra note 160, at 31: 
The fact is that, with respect to major technological applications, we lack 
criteria to guide the choice between efficient resource allocation, ordinarily achieved 
best through some form of market mechanism (improved as necessary to compen-
sate for external costs and benefits), and other objectives, usually achievable only 
through non-market mechanisms for expressing value preferences. Because we have 
a great many values other than economic efficiency, and no transactions in them 
that confront buyers and sellers, the idea of attempting to compute "net social 
benefits and costs" makes sense only as a very rough first approach. 
162. E.g., id.; E. MURPHY, supra note 32, at 255: 
It may be that the welfare economists are right in claiming that government can 
develop some sort of analog to the market which, through bargaining among 
representatives of contending interests, would allow an outcome which satisfies 
all interests. Even if the analog gave no more than a rough notion of the priorities 
attached to values and of the variety to be structured into decision-making, the 
help from welfare economics would be great. Unfortunately, the better argument 
may lie with those economists who say that such analogs are not possible. 
163. ASSESSMENT AND CHOICE, supra note 160, at 32-33. The National Environmental 
Policy Act endorses this concept in part by requiring agencies to consider "any irrevers-
ible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the 
proposed action." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(v) (1970). 
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tates that investigation and evaluation of possible approaches to a 
problem should take place at the earliest possible stage of the deci-
sion-making process. If fundamental choices are delayed too long, 
they may fall prey to the "tyranny of small decisions," a term which 
refers to the phenomenon of "incremental choices that, taken by 
themselves, may seem unworthy of notice but, taken altogether, may 
create problems of major proportions."164 The concept of early as-
sessment of alternatives should be coupled with a process of con-
tinuous monitoring in order to test the validity of the early analysis 
and to discover later problems as they emerge.165 
While the terminology of technology assessment may be novel, 
however, these basic concepts have often been acknowledged-per-
haps with insufficient emphasis-in administrative law. The real 
problem is determining when they should be applied. For example, 
it is obvious to most observers and participants in AEC reactor licens-
ing that all parties would benefit from resolution of environmental 
issues at the earliest possible time; however, there has been consid-
erable dispute over the question of when a nuclear power plant's 
design is sufficiently complete to support a detailed investigation of 
its environmental effects.166 By the same token, a tentative agency 
approval that would permit subsequent monitoring and alteration of 
plans167 may be impossible to distinguish from action that is tenta-
tive in form, but in fact creates irreversible momentum that will 
foreclose alternative approaches.168 Finally, the principle advocated 
by some commentators on technology assessment-that the basic 
questions are political rather than technical or legal169-provides 
164. ASSESSMENT AND CHOICE, supra note 160, at 10, 69-70. 
165. See id. at 51: 
It seems clear that our theoretical understanding will never be so complete as to 
obviate the need to install and maintain comprehensive and sensitive monitoring 
systems . • • to detect low-level perturbations and thereby make possible reliable 
early warnings of potentially deleterious trends •.• which our basic research did 
not enable us to anticipate. 
166. See generally Berg, Boyer &: Johnston, supra note 4, at 20-32. 
167. See, e.g., National Air Carrier Assn. v. CAB, 436 F.2d 185, 192-93 (D.C. Cir. 
1970); American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 633 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 
U.S. 843 (1966). 
168. See Pennsylvania Gas &: Water Co. v. FPC, 427 F.2d 568, 574-76 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
169. E.g., Address by Professor Harold P. Green before the Technology Assessment 
Seininar Series, George Washington University, March 19, 1969, The Adversary Process 
in Technology Assessment, at 3: 
Since the issue is one of benefits to the public versus costs (including risks) to 
the public, the focus of technology assessment should be to arrive at a conclusion 
as to what costs (including risks) the public is prepared to assume in exchange for 
what benefits. In our democracy, sucli decisions cannot appropriately be made by 
an elite body of specialists and generalists (who are specialists in technology assess-
ment). They should be made by the public itself expressing its views through its 
elected representatives in Congress who are accountable to their constituents. This 
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little guidance for the agency that has been given the duty of resolv-
ing polycentric controversies.170 
Another discipline that seems at first impression likely to provide 
useful insights into the possible adaptation of modem management 
techniques for resolving polycentric controversies is decision theory, 
which has been described as a body of knowledge dealing with "the 
proper course of action to be taken by a decision maker who may 
gain or lose by taking action upon uncertain data that inconclusively 
support or discredit differing hypotheses about the state of the real 
but nonetheless unknowable world."171 In other words, it seeks to 
provide scientific methods for dealing with uncertainty. It builds 
upon the "subjective theory" of probability, which seeks to analyze 
the degrees of belief that a rational, coherent decision maker would 
possess in varying factual circumstances,172 including a situation in 
which probabilities are continuously re-evaluated as new data be-
come available.173 
In addition to analyzing the decider's belief in the probability of 
specified occurrences or propositions, decision theory also attempts 
to account for the manner in which he perceives the utilities of vari-
ous possible decisions that are available to him.174 The probability 
and utility of each possible outcome combine to create a preference 
value for that outcome, and these preferences can be compared to 
assess the relative desirability of different decisions.175 For example, 
in a murder trial the fact finder may have four possible choices (first 
or second degree murder, manslaughter, and innocence), each of 
which may or may not correspond to factual reality, making a total 
of sixteen possible combinations of verdict and fact. Obviously, the 
possible decisions with the least "utility" will be those in which an 
innocent man is found guilty, and the more serious the verdict is 
in each of these cases, the less utility there is in that particular deci-
sion. Thus, it logically should require a higher degree of belief in 
requires that the entire assessment process take place in the open with full articula-
tion in language the public can understand of the benefits and costs (including 
risks). 
See also ASSESSMENT AND CHOICE, supra note 160, at 81-82. 
170. See generally Murphy, supra note 4. 
171. Kaplan, supra note 49, at 1065. 
172. Cullison, Probability Analysis of Judicial Fact-Finding: A Preliminary Outline 
of the Subjective Approach, 1969 TOLEDO L. R.Ev. 538, 551-54. 
173. Id. at 556. 
174. Id. at 557-58. 
175. Kaplan, supra note 49, at 1079. 
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probable guilt to convict a possibly innocent man of first degree 
murder than to convict him of manslaughter.176 
The usefulness of trying to apply this kind of analysis to poly-
centric problems seems doubtful. Even the preceding discussion, 
which was greatly oversimplified and dealt with a comparatively 
simple problem, suggests that the calculus can quickly become so 
complicated that it can be made workable only by distorting or mis-
stating the problem to reduce the number of variables involved.177 
There is also likely to be a serious problem of ignoring or improp-
erly accounting for "soft variables,"178 and in many polycentric issues 
there is likely to be sharp disagreement even among experts over 
both probabilities and utilities. Finally, commentators have asserted 
that decision theory works best when it is used as a means of attaining 
"some external set of agreed-upon ends,"179 rather than in making a 
trade-off among conflicting and disputed goals. For the most part, 
then, the rigorously quantified techniques of decision theory seem 
more likely to produce error and dissatisfaction in resolving poly-
centric controversies than traditional cost-benefit analysis. 
A final body of management-oriented theory worth investigating 
is the loose conglomeration of divergent concepts and analytical ap-
proaches generally referred to as "systems analysis."180 While much 
of systems analysis is concerned with situations in which the desired 
output and the relevant variables can be specified with precision,181 
176. See id. at 1078-80. 
177. See Fuller on Adjudication, supra note 23, at 41. 
178. See text accompanying notes 110-13 supra. 
179. Tribe, supra note 49, at 1391. Cf. Cullison, supra note 172, at 539: 
There are two kinds of problems involved in probabilistic decision-making. 
First is the matter of determining what threshold probability is needed to justify 
a decision to take action .••• This phase of decision-making involves value as well 
as probability considerations. • . • Second is the matter of assigning probabilities 
in one way or another to events or propositions upon which a decision is to be 
predicated. 
180. See generally F. KAsr & J. RosENZWEIG, supra note 108; G. BLACK, supra note 
148. The basic rationale of systems analysis is concisely stated in E. MURPHY, supra 
note 32, at 231: 
Underlying these [systems analysis] models is the notion that there is a need to take 
into orderly account the important relationships among the individual economic, 
institutional, or technical elements of processes, structures and problems. The 
various elements and their relationships compose systems, and the organized 
methodical study of these holds out promise for more completely based govern-
mental decisions. 
181. E.g., G. BLACK, supra note 148, at 7: 
The first phase of a systems analysis is understanding and translating into 
analytically meaningful terms the objectives that are sought by some as-yet-un-
defined complex of equipment and/or activity, taking into account the environment 
in which it is to operate .••• [The next stages are]: 
1. the creation of an analytically manageable model of the interrelations be-
tween major elements of the system and the external world; 
2. quantification of functional relatiooships between rate of system operation 
and system "outputs"; 
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other aspects seem to have some relevance to polycentric problems. 
One concept that seems basically analogous to administrative reso-
lution of polycentric controversies is "the heuristic approach to sys-
tem design," a decision-making method "that uses principles to pro-
vide guides for action. Its principles provide action guides even in 
the face of completely unanticipated situations and in situations for 
which no formal model or analytic solution is available."182 This ap-
proach obviously has a rough counterpart in the adjudication of 
polycentric controversies, where there is typically a list of factors 
that the decision maker must consider, but no fixed formula for 
reaching a result. As developed in the field of computer program-
ming, heuristic approaches are based on the development of goals 
and subgoals, paralleling the methods that behaviorial studies have 
found human beings use in seeking solutions to complex problems: 
Problem solving proceeds by erecting goals, detecting differences 
between present situation and goal, finding in memory or by search 
tools or processes that are relevant to reducing differences of these· 
particular kinds, and applying these tools or processes. Each problem 
generates subproblems until we find a subproblem we can solve .•.• 
'\Ve proceed until, by successive solution of such subproblems, we 
eventually achieve our over-all goal-or give up.183 
Applying this analytical approach to a polycentric problem such as 
the environmental impact of a proposed power plant produces a 
basically pyramidal structure topped by the ultimate issue to be 
decided, which could be summarized as "what is the optimal trade-
off between economic benefit and damage to the environment?" At 
the next level of generality, the problem would divide into environ-
mental factors and economic considerations; and each of these would 
further subdivide into constituent parts so that, for example, en-
vironmental factors could be divided into the characteristics of the 
plant and the characteristics of the site, and then the latter problem 
further broken down into ecological, scenic, and historic values, and 
3. quantification of functional relationships between rate of system operation 
and system "inputs"; 
4. the combination of (2) and (3) into an over-all input-output relation-
ship .••• 
5. the determination from the input-output relationship of optimum system 
design and rates of inputs and outputs that correspond to an optimum operation 
of that system. 
182. R. BOGUSLAW, THE NEW UTOPIANS: A STUDY OF SYSTEM DESIGN AND SOCIAL 
CHANGE 13 (1965). "Heuristic" approaches are contrasted to "formalist" systems which 
are useful in "established situations" in which "all action-relevant environmental 
conditions are specifiable and predictable; all action-relevant states of the system are 
specifiable and predictable; [and] available research technology or records are adequate 
to provide statements about the probable consequences of alternative actions." Id. at 7. 
Cf. note 144 supra. 
183. H. Simon, The New Science of Management Decision, quoted in R. BocuSLAw, 
supra note 182, at 74-75. 
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so on. The aim would be to generate a number of small, manageable 
subproblems at the base of the pyramid, each of which could pre-
sumably be assigned to different staff units for resolution through 
whatever type of decision-making process is best suited to the subject 
matter at hand. 
Some agencies are currently exploring similar models of environ-
mental decision-making. The Atomic Energy Commission recently 
issued draft guides for the preparation of environmental statements 
which seek to direct license applicants into the detailed analysis of 
manageable subproblems.184 Perhaps the most striking feature of 
these guides is the staggering range of detail and analysis they re-
quire. For example, the section on "Ecology," which only occupies 
about a half page out of nearly forty printed pages comprising the 
body of the guides, directs the license applicant to provide the fol-
lowing information: 
[T]he applicant should identify the important local flora and 
fauna, their habitats and distribution as well as the relationship 
between species and their environments. A species, whether animal 
or plant, is "important" if it is commercially or recreationally valu-
able, if it is rare or endangered, if it is of specific scientific interest 
or if it is necessary to the well-being of some significant species (e.g., 
a food chain component) or to the balance of the ecological system. 
In cataloging the local organisms, the applicant should identify 
and discuss the abundance of the terrestrial vertebrates, provide a 
map that shows the distribution of the principal plant communities, 
and describe the plant communities, and animal populations within 
the aquatic environments. The discussion should include species 
that migrate through the area or use it for breeding grounds. 
The discussion of species-environment relationships should in-
clude descriptions of area usage (e.g., habitat, breeding, etc.); it 
should include life histories of important regional animals, their 
normal population fluctuations and their habitat requirements (e.g., 
thermal tolerance ranges); and it should include identification of 
food chains and other interspecies relationships, particularly when 
these are contributory to predictions or evaluations of the impact 
of the nuclear plant on the regional biota. 
Identify any definable pre-existing environmental stresses from 
sources such as pollutants, as well as any ecological conditions sug-
gestive of such stresses. Describe the status of ecological succession. 
Discuss any important histories of disease occurring in the regional 
biota as well as vectors or reservoirs of disease, or serious infestation 
by pest species. 
The sources of information should be identified.185 
184. Atomic Energy Commission Directorate of Regulatory Standards, Guide to the 
Preparation of Environmental Reports for Nuclear Power Plants (issued for comment 
August 4, 1972). 
185. Id. at 8-9. 
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Properly fulfilling these information-gathering duties-for what is 
only a small part of the environmental report186-would probably 
require an investment of several man-years, and it is not entirely 
clear how this data should be evaluated by either the license appli-
cant or the AEC in reaching a general decision on ecological impact. 
Most of the factors set forth could be considered adjudicative facts 
since they relate to particular aspects of the license applicant's activ-
ity; moreover, affected interests or members of the general public 
could have a useful role to play in this type of inquiry by marshal-
ling additional data or exposing erroneous assumptions. Yet, it re-
quires no great imagination to generate a nearly interminable array 
of questions and issues which a delay-minded opponent could litigate 
if he were allowed to test the adequacy of the ecological analysis in 
trial-type hearings, particularly if the inquiry were broadened to 
encompass possible alternative sites and alternative modes of power 
generation.187 Thus, even when polycentric problems are carefully 
subdivided, there may be no simple or completely satisfactory answer 
to the procedural questions. 
A similar difficulty in the pyramidal, system-analysis approach is 
caused by the relationships existing among the small "subproblems" 
at the bottom of the pyramid. A common premise of systems analysis 
is that the subproblems are discrete questions for which an optimal 
answer can be found without substantial reference to or impact upon 
the other subproblems that are being simultaneously resolved.188 In 
the kinds of environmental questions discussed above, however, 
this kind of divisibility may be unattainable. For example, a con-
clusion that a power plant should be equipped with cooling towers 
to avoid unacceptable thermal effects on aquatic life would require an 
extensive re-evaluation of scenic considerations, since cooling towers 
are unsightly, and of economic factors, since they are expensive. The 
problem is that many environmental and safety questions seem to 
involve this kind of indivisible, synergistic relationship among con-
stituent factors which resist division into manageable subproblems. 
Thus, systems analysis approaches may be useful not so much in 
providing a usable design for decision-making procedures as in 
186. In AEC practice, the license applicant prepares an "environmental report"; this 
is submitted to the AEC staff, which drafts and circulates an environmental impact 
statement. See generally 10 C.F.R. § 50, app. D (1972). 
187. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 4, at 13-23. 
188. E.g., G. BLACK, supra note 148, at 26: 
[S]ystems analysis is rooted in an enormous detail of subsystem analysis in which 
subsystem engmeers optimize the portion of a system which is their responsibility, 
and by having done this, enable a system engineer to optimize, in simpler terms, 
the system as a whole. For systems analysts to arrive at optimum system specifica-
tions, however, the subsystems analysts must have this capability also. 
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forcing a methodical, logical effort to investigate the possible ways 
in which complex problems can be broken down into component 
parts. In many situations, the result of this kind of analysis may be 
the conclusion that detailed, issue-by-issue analysis is so costly in time 
and resources that efficiency dictates a more summary-and perhaps 
less accurate-method of resolving the question.189 
B. Consensual Models 
In contrast to the managerial methods of decision-making, which 
rely upon the application of expert judgment, there are numerous 
procedural forms depending upon decision-by-concord that can be 
adapted to the administrative context. In extreme form, the consen-
sual approach would result in deregulation so that broad resource-
allocation and value trade-off decisions would occur as a product of 
the myriad of consensual arrangements entered into by private par-
ties. Since administrative regulation has been imposed as a result 
of perceived failures in the market system, it seems doubtful that the 
free-market approach can have more than peripheral impact on ad-
ministrative problems.190 However, this does not mean that other 
consensual approaches that provide for decisions based on a system 
of voting or negotiating cannot be useful in the administrative pro-
cess. 
In rare instances, the consent of affected interests as reflected in 
a referendum or other direct vote of the people can be given effect 
in the administrative process, as in Citizens for Allegan County, Inc. 
v. FPC.191 The case arose out of FPC approval of a license transfer 
and merger resulting from a city's sale of an electric power plant it 
had owned and operated; the sale had been approved by a city refer-
endum and opponents of the sale thereafter sought to intervene in 
the FPC proceeding. They were denied opportunity to present evi-
dence and argument by the Commission, a decision which the court 
affirmed largely because of the "unique feature" of the referendum. 
However, the court did acknowledge a "difference in focus" between 
the city and the FPC,192 and concluded that because the FPC was re-
189. See generally Murphy, supra note 4. 
190. One area in which the possibility of deregulation is currently receiving serious 
attention is in economic control of surface transportation. See generally Ase CouNCIL 
REPORT, supra note 1, at 61-85. 
191. 414 F .2d ll25 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
192. 414 F.2d at ll30: 
The FPC is not interested alone in economic costs. It must consider other elements 
of the public interest, including specifically, here, the impact on the recreational 
use of the lake. The City has an even broader outlook. It may properly consider 
benefit to other public uses having no nexus whatever to the electrical system as 
such-e.g., the possibility of devoting the proceeds to schools, or hospitals, etc. 
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quired to consider the impact on nonvoters, it could not accord 
conclusive effect to the referendum.103 The process of weighing the 
interest of "voters" and "nonvoters" seems a highly subjective un-
dertaking, particularly in the context of a polycentric problem where 
the impact of a proposed action on a broad range of interests may 
be quite speculative. 
An alternative to the "direct vote" or referendum approach is 
the practice of providing representation for affected interests within 
the administrative process. Professor Davis has praised the system of 
representative industry committees established under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938:194 
[T]he Act placed the primary authority in industry committees to 
be appointed by the Administrator. Each committee was composed 
of equal numbers of representatives of the public, of employees, and 
of employers, and a two-thirds vote was required. Altogether, 70 
industry committees were appointed. The committees had power 
only to make recommendations, but the Administrator could ap-
prove or reject recommendations only in their entirety and could 
not revise them. . .. 
[T]he experience proves that a successful marriage can be brought 
about between the democratic methods embodied in the device of 
the representative committee and the relatively scientific methods 
supplied by the economists and the statisticians who advise the 
Administrator. No wage order could be entered under the system 
without a concurrence of the ideas produced by these two methods. 
To the extent that members of committees used the procedures of 
bargaining and mediation within the committees, instead of merely 
studying the available materials to arrive at a purportedly judicial 
judgment on the questions at issue, the democratic process operated 
effectively, and at the same time the Administrator's supervision and 
final approval of recommendations protected against the excesses 
and irrationalities of democratic processes and assured a compliance 
with the basic will of Congress.195 
Even this successful example raises a number of questions, however. 
As the quotation suggests, there is a threshold question of the degree 
to which the "excesses and irrationalities" of democratic procedures 
should be tolerated. A system in which a "rational" agency and a 
193. 414 F.2d at 1130: 
In this vortex of factors affecting the public interest we think the Commission 
was entitled, in its determination of public interest, to accord significant weight to 
the determination made by the city council, and electorate, if carried out with fair 
procedures. The City's determination was not made decisive, nor could it be. Thus 
the Commission must take into account the impact of the proposal on consumers 
who were not voters-here commercial customers. 
194. 29 u.s.c. §§ 201-19 (1970). 
195. 1 K. DAVIS TREATISE, supra note 14, § 6.03, at 368-70. 
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potentially "irrational" representative body must concur in order to 
take action essentially means that needed activity can be vetoed on 
irrational grounds. Other forms of apportioning responsibility con-
front the Allegan County problem: what weight should be accorded 
a "democratic" decision when it is relevant, but not conclusive? 
In addition, there are numerous questions surrounding the 
nebulous notion of "representativeness." If the committee members 
are to be appointed rather than elected, should safeguards such as 
bipartisan political affiliation or professional training or employ-
ment affiliations be imposed to ensure against the committee being 
"stacked" in favor of a particular result?196 When one moves beyond 
purely economic regulation to issues such as safety or environmental 
impact, it makes little sense to use a tripartite committee composed 
of representatives from labor, management, and the public; the 
affected interests may well be so indeterminate and shifting that it 
will prove impossible to discern them in the absence of a particular 
issue. And within definable categories, such as "labor," there may be 
conflicting constituencies-for example, organized and unorganized 
labor, skilled and unskilled workers, and blue- and white-collar 
groups-who can make inconsistent claims on the right to have their 
interests represented. Finally, what account should be taken of the 
intensity of the represented constitutencies' concerns? The two-thirds 
vote requirements in the industry committee system described above 
implies a belief that minority preferences should not be too easily 
overridden, but it still leaves open, for example, the possibility that 
public and labor members could effectively override management in 
a series of decisions, no matter how serious or valid the latter's ap-
prehensions might be. Obviously, the persistence of this kind of 
situation could easily undermine the acceptability of the system. 
The problem of selecting representatives can be avoided by 
creating a self-selection process in which those who believe their 
interests to be affected are provided an opportunity to articulate 
their concerns and voice their preferences. Notice-and-comment rule-
making, which has been described as a "quasi-legislative (hence, 
political) process [in which] the group's viewpoint becomes a relevant 
datum simply because the group holds it,"1111 is the paradigm of this 
196. Cf. Lehman, Crime, The Public, and the Crime Commission: A Critical Review 
of the Challenge of Crime in a Free Sodety, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1487, 1499-508 (1968), 
which provides an interesting discussion of the "art" of selecting a presidential com-
mission so that the members will support a preordained result and win the support of 
various constituencies. 
197. Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broaden-ed Public Participation in 
the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525,536 (1972). See also id. at 531-32; Gellhorn, 
Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 369 (1972). 
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type of consensual approach. It differs from the referendum or 
representative-committee system in not having an identifiable, even 
quantified, weight assigned to certain affected interests; rather, the 
task of weighing the expressed views is assigned to the agency, within 
broad limits of discretion, and thus the consensual attributes of the 
system can be undermined if the agency does not accurately per-
ceive and weigh the affected interests.198 The problem is com-
pounded by the fact that the broad public interest standards govern-
ing many areas of agency activity, as well as the cases requiring 
agencies to seek "optimally beneficial" solutions to certain kinds of 
questions,199 indicate that the agency decision maker should not 
rely solely on the views presented to him, but rather must discern 
and evaluate the concerns of unrepresented, unarticulated interests. 
A final distinguishable method of resolving controversies by 
consent is a true bargaining approach in which affected interests 
negotiate solutions by compromise or agreement. Bargaining ap-
proaches take a variety of forms ranging from the situation in which 
the agency or some subdivision of it is a party to the bargaining, 
acting as a surrogate for affected segments of the general public, to 
the case in which an agency merely serves as a mediator between 
conflicting claims of private interests. In either type of situation, 
the process will usually differ from the familiar bargaining model 
of negotiating a labor contract. In labor bargaining, each side will 
have economic weapons to which it can resort in the event the other 
side fails to make good faith efforts, and there is some inherent 
pressure toward compromise implicit in the fact that the parties 
must maintain an ongoing relationship after the bargaining has 
concluded.200 The absence of these incentives to agree means that 
an alternative, nonconsensual form of decision-making must be 
available, and the form that this coercive process takes can have a 
great impact on the structure and content of the bargaining.201 More-
198. Cf. Bernstein, supra note 12, at 593: 
Most of the comparative advantages of rule making rather than adjudication as a 
means of policy making assume that the Board will utilize the rule making pro-
cedure effectively. If the Board holds a rule making hearing, for example, but does 
not carefully study the views of those who contribute them, the advantage of a 
variety of viewpoints is nullified. 
199. See text accompanying notes 103-09 supra. 
200. See generally Fuller, supra note 37. 
201. Cf. Berg, Boyer 8c Johnston, supra note 4, at 22. 
[T]he fact that active participation [in AEC reactor licensing hearings] by object-
ing parties can lengthen the hearing and thus impose increased costs on the appli-
cant gives these parties, in the [applicant] utilities' view, an unfair bargaining 
advantage. Often the applicants feel that intervenors can use the bargaining 
leverage conferred by the prospect of protracted hearings to extract agreements 
to provide additional systems for the plant, such as cooling towers, which would 
not be cost-justified if the issue were considered on the merits. 
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over, where the agency bargains as a surrogate for affected segments 
of the public it may prove an ineffective bargainer,202 or may be per-
ceived by the public as ineffectual, thereby weakening either the ac-
curacy or the acceptability of the decision. The alternatives to 
requiring the agency to bargain on behalf of unrepresented interests 
of the general public are either allowing affected interests to bargain 
on their own behalf, which raises questions of whether multiparty 
negotiations will be manageable,203 or acknowledging private groups 
to appear as representatives of affected interests, which raises prob-
lems about the degree to which they truly reflect the interests of 
affected constitutencies. 
In general, then, consensual decision-making can take a variety 
of forms in the administrative context, each with particular ad-
vantages and disadvantages. The troublesome problems seem to 
concern matters of accuracy and acceptability-the difficulties of 
identifying affected constituencies, discovering their preferences, 
and in weighing these preferences, both in relation to those of other 
constituencies and with respect to considerations other than the 
preferences of those affected. 
V. CONCLUSION 
That problems and shortcomings can be found in each of the 
major forms of administrative decision-making is not surprising; 
202. The dynamics of the negotiating process, and the incentive structure affecting 
agency negotiators, can lead to a less than optimal result. See, e.g., Cavers, Administer-
ing That Ounce of Prevention: New Drugs and Nuclear Reactors II, 68 W. VA. L. REv. 
233, 241-42 (1966): 
The official, though low in the agency's hierarchy, has the power to hold up 
the approval or the permit. His view may not ultimately prevail but, by sticking 
to it, he can at least protract the proceedings .••. 
Perhaps the applicant's most important lever is a shared purpose: presumably 
in most cases both parties will want to see the application go through •.•• Hence, 
the applicant's experts and counsel may seek subtly to make the staff experts feel 
like obstructionists, magnifying difficulties that more practical men consider well 
within a reasonable zone of tolerance. • • • [If] he holds his ground, the industry 
negotiators can regretfully intimate that they will have to go higher up, perhaps, 
if the case is serious, beyond the walls of the agency itself ..•• 
• • • (.T]he choice will rarely be between intransigence and surrender. • • • 
Compromises . • • are inevitable, and probably are very often in the public 
interest. Unfortunately, if the staff is weak or its morale low, the staff may yield 
more than the public interest would allow. 
203. Cf. Fuller, supra note 37, at 313: 
The dyadic [i.e., two-party] relationship is one eminently suited to mediation 
and often dependent upon it as the only measure capable of solving its internal 
problems. Indeed, one may ask whether mediation in the strict sense is really 
possible in ordering the internal affairs of any group larger than two. If A, B 
and C are all at odds with one another, it is extremely difficult for an outsider, 
say, X, to undertake a mediative role without becoming a participant in the internal 
maneuvers of the quarreling members. If X asks A's acquiescence in a proposed 
solution, A may reply that he will give his assent if X will undertake to persuade 
B to withdraw a concession B made in favor of C. X may thus end by becoming a 
manipulated tool of those he sought to guide. In this predicament he may face 
the alternative of retaining the empty title of mediator or becoming, in effect, a 
fourth member of the group and a participant in its internal games. 
November 1972] Administrative Trial-Type Hearings 169 
unfortunately, it is always easier to criticize than to recommend. 
Perhaps the most difficult underlying problem is that polycentric 
controversies exhibit a blend of technical, factual, and political at-
tributes that often seem nearly impossible to separate or accom-
modate within a single procedural framework. Ideally, Congress 
should speak more clearly and in greater detail to many of the 
polycentric value conflicts now thrust upon the agencies. Since this 
seems an unlikely possibility, however, the next best approach may 
be for the agencies to use mixed procedural forms that encompass 
both consensual and nonconsensual devices. 
If movement in this direction is desirable, the next question is 
at what level it should be accomplished: either for all agency activity 
by amendment of the Administrative Procedure Act, or for particular 
agency functions as in the recent statutes prescribing specialized 
procedures for particular grants of rule-making authority,204 or 
through an effort to minimize statutory restraints so that the agencies 
can impose additional procedural requirements, whether they be 
managerial models, consensual approaches, or trial-type hearings, as 
dictated by the nature of a particular proceeding or specific issues. 
The commentators205 and some judicial decisions206 tend to support 
the latter approach, which at least seems the preferable course until 
enough experience is gained to warrant generalization. 
This type of procedural flexibility could be substantially achieved 
under many of the existing statutes if agencies made a conscious and 
consistent effort to resolve polycentric controversies within the 
general format of notice-and-comment rule-making, supplementing 
the minimum rule-making procedures as it appeared desirable to 
do so. Even when trial-type hearings are required, it may be possible 
to approximate the same kinds of results by using the pretrial phases 
to provide appropriate managerial or consensual techniques, re-
quiring high threshold showings before a party is allowed to litigate 
204. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 8ll (1970) (coal mine health and safety standards); 29 
U.S.C. § 655 (1970) (occupational health and safety standards). The objection to pro-
ceeding at this level of generality was expressed in the following terms by Dean Carl 
Auerbach at the Seventh Plenary Session of the Administrative Conference of the 
United States: 
I do not think it would be a good idea to require the Congress, [in drafting) a 
statute which delegates rulemaking authority to administrative agencies, to deter-
mine at that time which one of the rulemaking techniques will serve all the 
purposes of that particular statute. I think that [the proper procedure) depends 
not on what is generally within the jurisdiction of the agency delegated to it by 
the statute, but [on) the nature of the particular rule in question. 
Transcript, Seventh Plenary Session, ACUS, June 9, 1972, at 150-51. 
205. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 4; Clagett, supra note 9. 
206. See, e.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
382 U.S. 982 (1966). Cf. Marine Space Enclosures, Inc. v. FMC, 420 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 
1969). 
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some kinds of issues on the merits, and experimenting with inter-
vention practice to permit a variety of forms of public partici-
pation.207 Significant progress in this area would require a willing-
ness on the part of the agencies to take the initiative in devoting 
thought and effort to refining procedural techniques rather than 
merely using the minimum procedures mandated by law and re-
sponding to demands for procedural rights in an ad hoc fashion. It 
would also require sensitivity to the needs and interests of affected 
constituencies in situations where there are few firm benchmarks for 
the kinds of procedures that are appropriate. In a few areas, such 
as the FDA drug efficacy studies and environmental decision-making 
at the AEC, agencies are being forced into procedural reassessment 
and innovation by the complexity of the issues raised and by the 
hard-fought contests waged by competing interests. If agencies can 
respond effectively to these problems and benefit from accumulated 
experience, the traditional claim that administrative agencies can 
respond with flexibility and imagination to complex problems may 
acquire a new substance. 
207. For example, some agencies, such as the AEC, provide for "limited appearances" 
in which intervenors may appear at hearings and either make statements or ask 
questions about the issues. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.715 (1972). 
An imaginative variant of the "limited appearance" technique has been used in 
some Civil Aeronautics Board proceedings. Letter from Merritt Ruhlen, former CAB 
hearing examiner, to the author, June 16, 1972: 
In 1969 the Board instituted a proceeding, Part 298 Weight Limitation Investigation, 
Docket 21761, to investigate permitting the air taxis greater latitude in providing 
scheduled services. Although [it was) primarily a rule-making proceeding, the 
Board, to obtain detailed information concerning the air taxi industry and its 
problems, set this matter down for formal hearing. 
The Bureau of Operating Rights, (Board staff) and I used a questionnaire to get 
the basic information. [It] was circulated to the more than 1,300 air taxi operators 
registered with the Federal Aviation Agency. Approximately 425 replied and the 
Bureau analyzed the first 381 and submitted this analysis to all parties before 
hearing. 
At the close of the hearings the Bureau moved the admission into evidence 
without cross-examination of all the factual material contained in all the question-
naires and the receipt of the other material as statements of position. Over objec-
tion the motion was granted. 
An analogous use of opinion-polling techniques occurs in FCC broadcast licensing, where 
license applicants use sampling and other survey research methods to support the 
contention that their programming is responsive to local needs. See, e.g., Citizens Com-
mittee v. FCC, 436 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
